Federated TLS Authentication
draft-halen-fed-tls-auth-17
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Jakob Schlyter , Stefan Halén | ||
| Last updated | 2025-05-21 (Latest revision 2025-02-04) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-halen-fedae | ||
| RFC stream | Independent Submission | ||
| Intended RFC status | Informational | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews | |||
| IETF conflict review | conflict-review-halen-fed-tls-auth | ||
| Stream | ISE state | In ISE Review | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2025-02-04 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-halen-fedae | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes the Federated TLS Authentication (FedTLS) protocol, enabling secure machine-to-machine communication within a federation. Both clients and servers perform mutual TLS authentication, establishing trust based on a centrally managed trust anchor published by the federation. Additionally, FedTLS ensures unambiguous identification of entities, as only authorized members within the federation can publish metadata, further mitigating risks associated with unauthorized entities impersonating legitimate participants. This framework promotes seamless and secure interoperability across different trust domains adhering to common policies and standards within the federation.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)