OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Applications
draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps-25
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (oauth WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Aaron Parecki , Philippe De Ryck , David Waite | ||
| Last updated | 2025-07-08 (Latest revision 2025-07-03) | ||
| Replaces | draft-parecki-oauth-browser-based-apps, draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Best Current Practice | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Associated WG milestone |
|
||
| Document shepherd | Rifaat Shekh-Yusef | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2024-12-24 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC Ed Queue | |
| Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Deb Cooley | ||
| Send notices to | rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
| IANA action state | No IANA Actions | ||
| RFC Editor | RFC Editor state | MISSREF | |
| Details |
draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps-25
Web Authorization Protocol A. Parecki
Internet-Draft Okta
Intended status: Best Current Practice P. De Ryck
Expires: 5 January 2026 Pragmatic Web Security
D. Waite
Ping Identity
4 July 2025
OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Applications
draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps-25
Abstract
This specification details the threats, attack consequences, security
considerations and best practices that must be taken into account
when developing browser-based applications that use OAuth 2.0.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Web Authorization
Protocol Working Group mailing list (oauth@ietf.org), which is
archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-browser-based-apps.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 January 2026.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. History of OAuth 2.0 in Browser-Based Applications . . . . . 6
5. The Threat of Malicious JavaScript . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Attack Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.1. Single-Execution Token Theft . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.2. Persistent Token Theft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.3. Acquisition and Extraction of New Tokens . . . . . . 10
5.1.4. Proxying Requests via the User's Browser . . . . . . 11
5.2. Attack Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2.1. Exploiting Stolen Refresh Tokens . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2.2. Exploiting Stolen Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2.3. Client Hijacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Application Architecture Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. Backend For Frontend (BFF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1.1. Application Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1.2. Implementation Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.1.3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.1.4. Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.2. Token-Mediating Backend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.2.1. Application Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2.2. Implementation Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.2.3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.2.4. Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.3. Browser-based OAuth 2.0 client . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.3.1. Application Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.3.2. Implementation Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.3.3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.3.4. Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7. Discouraged and Deprecated Architecture Patterns . . . . . . 43
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7.1. Single-Domain Browser-Based Applications (not using
OAuth) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.1.1. Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2. OAuth Implicit Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2.1. Historic Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2.2. Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.2.3. Further Attacks on the Implicit Grant . . . . . . . . 46
7.2.4. Disadvantages of the Implicit Grant . . . . . . . . . 47
7.3. Resource Owner Password Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.4. Handling the OAuth Flow in a Service Worker . . . . . . . 48
7.4.1. Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8. Token Storage in the Browser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.1. Cookies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8.2. Token Storage in a Service Worker . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8.3. Token Storage in a Web Worker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8.4. In-Memory Token Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8.5. Persistent Token Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.6. Filesystem Considerations for Browser Storage APIs . . . 55
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
9.1. Reducing the Authority of Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
9.2. Sender-Constrained Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9.3. Authorization Server Mix-Up Mitigation . . . . . . . . . 57
9.4. Isolating Applications using Origins . . . . . . . . . . 57
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1. Introduction
This specification describes different architectural patterns for
implementing OAuth 2.0 clients in applications executing in a
browser. The specification outlines the security challenges for
browser-based applications and analyzes how different patterns can
help address some of these challenges.
This document focuses on JavaScript frontend applications acting as
the OAuth client (defined in Section 1.1 of [RFC6749]), interacting
with the authorization server (Section 1.1 of [RFC6749]) to obtain
access tokens and optionally refresh tokens. The client uses the
access token to access protected resources on resource servers
(Section 1.1 of [RFC6749]). When using OAuth, the client,
authorization server, and resource servers are all considered
independent parties, regardless of whether each is owned or operated
by the same entity.
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Note that many web applications consist of a frontend and API running
on a common domain, allowing for an architecture that does not rely
on OAuth 2.0. This is described in more detail in Section 7.1 Such
scenarios can rely on OpenID Connect [OpenID] for federated user
authentication, after which the application maintains the user's
authentication state. Such a scenario, (which only uses OAuth 2.0 as
the underlying specification of OpenID Connect), is not within scope
of this specification.
For native application developers using OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect,
an IETF BCP (best current practice) was published that guides
integration of these technologies. This document is formally known
as [RFC8252] or BCP212, but often referred to as "AppAuth" after the
OpenID Foundation-sponsored set of libraries that assist developers
in adopting these practices. [RFC8252] makes specific
recommendations for how to securely implement OAuth clients in native
applications, including incorporating additional OAuth extensions
where needed.
This specification, OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Applications,
highlights how the security properties of browser-based applications
are vastly different than those of native applications, as well as
addresses the similarities between implementing OAuth clients as
native applications and browser-based applications. This document is
primarily focused on OAuth, except where OpenID Connect provides
additional considerations.
Many of these recommendations are derived from the Best Current
Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security [RFC9700], as browser-based
applications are expected to follow those recommendations as well.
This document expands on and further restricts various
recommendations given in [RFC9700].
2. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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3. Terminology
This specification uses the terms "access token", "authorization
endpoint", "authorization grant", "authorization server", "client",
"client identifier" (client ID), "protected resource", "refresh
token", "resource owner", "resource server", and "token endpoint"
defined by OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], and "bearer token" defined by
[RFC6750].
In addition to the terms defined in referenced specifications, this
document uses the following terms:
"OAuth": In this document, "OAuth" refers to OAuth 2.0, [RFC6749]
and [RFC6750].
"Browser-based application": An application that is dynamically
downloaded and executed in a web browser, usually written in
JavaScript. Also sometimes referred to as a "single-page
application", or "SPA".
This document discusses the security of browser-based applications,
which are executed by the browser in a runtime environment. In most
scenarios, these applications are JavaScript (JS) applications
running in a JavaScript execution environment. Given the popularity
of this scenario, this document uses the term "JavaScript" to refer
to all mechanisms that allow code to execute in the application's
runtime in the browser. The recommendations and considerations in
this document are not exclusively linked to the JavaScript language
or its runtime, but also apply to other languages and runtime
environments in the browser, such as Web Assembly
([W3C.wasm-core-2]).
"PKCE": Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE) [RFC7636], a mechanism to
prevent various attacks on OAuth authorization codes.
"DPoP": OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating of Proof of Possession (DPoP)
[RFC9449] is a mechanism to restrict access tokens to be used only
by the client they were issued to.
"CORS": Cross-Origin Resource Sharing [Fetch], a mechanism that
enables exceptions to the browser's same-origin policy.
"CSP": Content Security Policy [W3C.CSP3], a mechanism of
restricting which resources a particular web page can fetch or
execute.
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4. History of OAuth 2.0 in Browser-Based Applications
At the time that OAuth 2.0 was initially specified in [RFC6749] and
[RFC6750], browser-based JavaScript applications needed a solution
that strictly complied with the same-origin policy. Common
deployments of OAuth 2.0 involved an application running on a
different domain than the authorization server, so it was
historically not possible to use the Authorization Code grant type
(Section 4.1 of [RFC6749]) which would require a cross-origin POST
request. This limitation was one of the motivations for the
definition of the Implicit flow (Section 4.2 of [RFC6749]), which
returns the access token in the front channel via the fragment part
of the URL, bypassing the need for a cross-origin POST request.
However, there are several drawbacks to the Implicit flow, generally
involving vulnerabilities associated with the exposure of the access
token in the URL. See Section 7.2 for an analysis of these attacks
and the drawbacks of using the Implicit flow in browsers. Additional
attacks and security considerations can be found in [RFC9700].
In modern web development, widespread adoption of Cross-Origin
Resource Sharing (CORS) [Fetch] (which enables exceptions to the
same-origin policy) allows browser-based applications to use the
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code flow and make a POST request to exchange
the authorization code for an access token at the token endpoint.
Since the Authorization Code grant type enables the use of refresh
tokens, this behavior has been adopted for browser-based clients as
well, even though these clients are still public clients (defined in
Section 2.1 of [RFC6749]) with limited to no access to secure
storage. Furthermore, adding Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE)
[RFC7636] to the flow prevents authorization code injection, as well
as ensures that even if an authorization code is intercepted, it is
unusable by an attacker.
For this reason, and from other lessons learned, the current best
practice for browser-based applications is to use the OAuth 2.0
Authorization Code grant type with PKCE. There are various
architectural patterns for deploying browser-based applications, both
with and without a corresponding server-side component. Each of
these architectures has specific trade-offs and considerations which
are discussed further in this document. Additional considerations
apply for first-party common-domain applications.
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5. The Threat of Malicious JavaScript
Malicious JavaScript poses a significant risk to browser-based
applications. Attack vectors, such as cross-site scripting (XSS) or
the compromise of remote code files, give an attacker the capability
to run arbitrary code in the application's execution context. This
malicious code is not isolated from the main application's code in
any way. Consequentially, the malicious code can not only take
control of the running execution context, but can also perform
actions within the application's origin. Concretely, this means that
the malicious code can steal data from the current page, interact
with other same-origin browsing contexts, send requests to a backend
from within the application's origin, steal data from origin-based
storage mechanisms (e.g., localStorage, IndexedDB), etc.
First and foremost, it is crucial to take proactive measures to avoid
the attacker from gaining a foothold in the first place. Doing so
involves, but is not limited to:
* Strictly applying context-sensitive output encoding and
sanitization when handling untrusted data
* Limiting or avoiding the loading of unchecked third-party
resources
* Using Subresource Integrity [W3C.SRI] to restrict valid scripts
that can be loaded
* Using a nonce-based or hash-based Content Security Policy
[W3C.CSP3] to prevent the execution of unauthorized script code
* Using origin isolation and HTML5 sandboxing to create boundaries
between different parts of the application
Further recommendations can be found in the OWASP Cheat Sheet series
[OWASPCheatSheet].
Unfortunately, history shows that even when applying these security
guidelines, there remains a risk that the attacker finds a way to
trigger the execution of malicious JavaScript. When analyzing the
security of browser-based applications in light of the presence of
malicious JS, it is crucial to realize that the *malicious JavaScript
code has the same privileges as the legitimate application code*. All
JS applications are exposed to this risk in some degree.
Applications might obtain OAuth tokens that confer authorization
necessary to their functioning. In combination, this effectively
gives compromised code the ability to use that authorization for
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malicious ends. Though the risk of attacker abuse of authorization
is unavoidable, there are ways to limit the extent to which a
compromised application can abuse that authorization. For instance,
this access might be limited to times when the application is in
active use, by limiting the type of tokens that might be obtained, or
by binding the tokens to the browser.
When the legitimate application code can access variables or call
functions, the malicious JS code can do exactly the same.
Furthermore, the malicious JS code can tamper with the regular
execution flow of the application, as well as with any application-
level defenses, since they are typically controlled from within the
application. For example, the attacker can remove or override event
listeners, modify the behavior of built-in functions (prototype
pollution), and stop pages in frames from loading.
The impact of malicious JavaScript on browser-based applications is a
widely studied and well-understood topic. However, the concrete
impact of malicious JavaScript on browser-based applications acting
as an OAuth client is quite unique, since the malicious JavaScript
can now impact the interactions during an OAuth flow. This section
explores the threats malicious JS code poses to a browser-based
application with the responsibilities of an OAuth client.
Section 5.1 discusses a few scenarios that attackers can use once
they have found a way to run malicious JavaScript code. These
scenarios paint a clear picture of the true power of the attacker,
which goes way beyond simple token exfiltration. Section 5.2
analyzes the impact of these attack scenarios on the OAuth client.
The remainder of this specification will refer back to these attack
scenarios and consequences to analyze the security properties of the
different architectural patterns.
5.1. Attack Scenarios
This section presents several attack scenarios that an attacker can
execute once they have found a vulnerability that allows the
execution of malicious JavaScript code. The attack scenarios include
trivial scenarios (Section 5.1.1) and elaborate scenarios
(Section 5.1.3). Note that this enumeration is non-exhaustive,
narrowly scoped to OAuth-specific features, and presented in no
particular order.
5.1.1. Single-Execution Token Theft
This scenario covers a simple token exfiltration attack, where the
attacker obtains and exfiltrates the client's current tokens. This
scenario consists of the following steps:
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* Execute malicious JS code
* Obtain tokens from the application's preferred storage mechanism
(See Section 8)
* Send the tokens to a server controlled by the attacker
* Store or abuse the stolen tokens
The recommended defensive strategy to decrease the risk associated
with a compromised access tokens is to reduce the scope and lifetime
of the token. For refresh tokens, the use of refresh token rotation
(as defined in Section 4.14.2 of [RFC9700]) offers a detection and
correction mechanism. Sender-constrained tokens (Section 9.2) offer
an additional layer of protection against stolen access tokens.
Note that this attack scenario is trivial and often used to
illustrate the dangers of malicious JavaScript. When discussing the
security of browser-based applications, it is crucial to avoid
limiting the attacker's capabilities to the attack discussed in this
scenario.
5.1.2. Persistent Token Theft
This attack scenario is a more advanced variation on the Single-
Execution Token Theft scenario (Section 5.1.1). Instead of
immediately stealing tokens upon the execution of the malicious code,
the attacker sets up the necessary handlers to steal the
application's tokens on a continuous basis. This scenario consists
of the following steps:
* Execute malicious JS code
* Setup a continuous token theft mechanism (e.g., on a 10-second
time interval)
- Obtain tokens from the application's preferred storage
mechanism (See Section 8)
- Send the tokens to a server controlled by the attacker
- Store the tokens
* Wait until the opportune moment to abuse the latest version of the
stolen tokens
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The crucial difference in this scenario is that the attacker always
has access to the latest tokens used by the application. This slight
variation in the attack scenario already suffices to counter typical
defenses against token theft, such as short lifetimes or refresh
token rotation.
For access tokens, the attacker now obtains the latest access token
for as long as the user's browser is online. Refresh token rotation
is not sufficient to prevent abuse of a refresh token. An attacker
can easily ensure that the application will not use the latest
refresh token. For example, the attacker could clear the
application's tokens after stealing them, wait until the user closes
the application, or wait until the user's browser goes offline.
Since the application will not use the latest refresh token, there
will be no detectable refresh token reuse, giving the attacker full
control over the stolen refresh token.
5.1.3. Acquisition and Extraction of New Tokens
In this advanced attack scenario, the attacker completely disregards
any tokens that the application has already obtained. Instead, the
attacker takes advantage of the ability to run malicious code that is
associated with the application's origin. With that ability, the
attacker can inject a hidden iframe and launch a silent Authorization
Code flow. This silent flow will reuse the user's existing session
with the authorization server and result in the issuing of a new,
independent access token (and optionally refresh token). This
scenario consists of the following steps:
* Execute malicious JS code
* Set up a handler to obtain the authorization code from the iframe
(e.g., by monitoring the frame's URL or via Web Messaging
[WebMessaging])
* Insert a hidden iframe into the page and initialize it with an
authorization request. The authorization request in the iframe
will occur within the user's session and, if the session is still
active, result in the issuing of an authorization code. Note that
this step relies on the Authorization Server supporting silent
frame-based flows, as discussed in the last paragraph of this
scenario.
* Extract the authorization code from the iframe using the
previously installed handler
* Send the authorization code to a server controlled by the attacker
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* Exchange the authorization code for a new set of tokens
* Abuse the stolen tokens
The most important takeaway from this scenario is that it runs a new
OAuth flow instead of focusing on stealing existing tokens. In
essence, even if the application finds a token storage mechanism that
is able to completely isolate the stored tokens from the attacker,
the attacker will still be able to request a new set of tokens. Note
that because the attacker controls the application in the browser,
the attacker's Authorization Code flow is indistinguishable from a
legitimate Authorization Code flow.
This attack scenario is possible because the security of public
browser-based OAuth clients relies entirely on the redirect URI and
application's origin. When the attacker executes malicious
JavaScript code in the application's origin, they gain the capability
to inspect same-origin frames. As a result, the attacker's code
running in the main execution context can inspect the redirect URI
loaded in the same-origin frame to extract the authorization code.
There are no practical security mechanisms for frontend applications
that counter this attack scenario. Short access token lifetimes and
refresh token rotation are ineffective, since the attacker has a
fresh, independent set of tokens. Advanced security mechanism, such
as DPoP [RFC9449] are equally ineffective, since the attacker can use
their own key pair to setup and use DPoP for the newly obtained
tokens. Requiring user interaction with every Authorization Code
flow would effectively stop the automatic silent issuance of new
tokens, but this would significantly impact widely-established
patterns, such as bootstrapping an application on its first page
load, or single sign-on across multiple related applications, and is
not a practical measure.
5.1.4. Proxying Requests via the User's Browser
This attack scenario involves the attacker sending requests to the
OAuth resource server directly from within the OAuth client
application running in the user's browser. In this scenario, there
is no need for the attacker to abuse the application to obtain
tokens, since the browser will include its own cookies or tokens
along in the request. The requests to the resource server sent by
the attacker are indistinguishable from requests sent by the
legitimate application, since the attacker is running code in the
same context as the legitimate application. This scenario consists
of the following steps:
* Execute malicious JS code
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* Send a request to a resource server and process the response
To authorize the requests to the resource server, the attacker simply
mimics the behavior of the client application. For example, when a
client application programmatically attaches an access token to
outgoing requests, the attacker does the same. Should the client
application rely on an external component to augment the request with
the proper access token, then this external component will also
augment the attacker's request.
This attack pattern is well-known and also occurs with traditional
applications using HttpOnly session cookies. It is commonly accepted
that this scenario cannot be stopped or prevented by application-
level security measures. For example, DPoP [RFC9449] explicitly
considers this attack scenario to be out of scope.
5.2. Attack Consequences
Successful execution of an attack scenario can result in the theft of
access tokens and refresh tokens, or in the ability to hijack the
client application running in the user's browser. Each of these
consequences is relevant for browser-based OAuth clients. They are
discussed below in decreasing order of severity.
5.2.1. Exploiting Stolen Refresh Tokens
When the attacker obtains a valid refresh token from a browser-based
OAuth client, they can abuse the refresh token by running a Refresh
Token grant with the authorization server. The response of the
Refresh Token grant contains an access token, which gives the
attacker the ability to access protected resources (See
Section 5.2.2). In essence, abusing a stolen refresh token enables
long-term impersonation of the legitimate client application to
resource servers.
The attack is only stopped when the authorization server refuses a
refresh token because it has expired or rotated, or when the refresh
token is revoked. In a typical browser-based OAuth client, it is not
uncommon for a refresh token to remain valid for multiple hours, or
even days.
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5.2.2. Exploiting Stolen Access Tokens
If the attacker obtains a valid access token, they gain the ability
to impersonate the legitimate client application in a request to a
resource server. Concretely, possession of an access token allows
the attacker to send arbitrary requests to any resource server that
accepts the valid access token. In essence, abusing a stolen access
token enables short-term impersonation of the legitimate client
application to resource servers.
The attack ends when the access token expires or when a token is
revoked with the authorization server. In a typical browser-based
OAuth client, access token lifetimes can be quite short, ranging from
minutes to hours.
Note that the possession of the access token allows its unrestricted
use by the attacker. The attacker can send arbitrary requests to
resource servers, using any HTTP method, destination URL, header
values, or body.
The application can use DPoP to ensure its access tokens are bound to
non-exportable keys held by the browser. In that case, it becomes
significantly harder for the attacker to abuse stolen access tokens.
More specifically, with DPoP, the attacker can only abuse stolen
application tokens by carrying out an online attack, where the proofs
are calculated in the user's browser. This attack is described in
detail in Section 11.4 of [RFC9449]. However, when the attacker
obtains a fresh access token (and optionally refresh token), as
described in Section 5.1.3, they can set up DPoP for these tokens
using an attacker-controlled key pair. In that case, the attacker is
again free to abuse this newly obtained access token without
restrictions.
5.2.3. Client Hijacking
When stealing tokens is not possible or desirable, the attacker can
also choose to hijack the OAuth client application running in the
user's browser. This effectively allows the attacker to perform any
operations that the legitimate client application can perform.
Examples include inspecting data on the page, modifying the page, and
sending requests to backend systems. Alternatively, the attacker can
also abuse their access to the application to launch additional
attacks, such as tricking the client into acting on behalf of the
attacker using an attack such as session fixation
([SessionFixation]).
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Note that client hijacking is less powerful than directly abusing
stolen user tokens. In a client hijacking scenario, the attacker
cannot directly control the tokens and is restricted by the security
policies enforced on the client application. For example, a resource
server running on admin.example.org can be configured with a CORS
policy that rejects requests coming from a client running on
web.example.org. Even if the access token used by the client would
be accepted by the resource server, the resource server's strict CORS
configuration does not allow such a request. A resource server
without such a strict CORS policy can still be subject to adversarial
requests coming from the compromised client application.
6. Application Architecture Patterns
There are three main architectural patterns available when building
browser-based applications that rely on OAuth for accessing protected
resources.
* A browser-based application that relies on a backend component for
handling OAuth responsibilities and forwards all requests through
the backend component (Backend-For-Frontend or BFF)
* A browser-based application that relies on a backend component for
handling OAuth responsibilities, but calls resource servers
directly using the access token (Token-Mediating Backend)
* A browser-based application acting as the client, handling all
OAuth responsibilities in the browser (Browser-based OAuth Client)
Each of these architectural patterns offers a different trade-off
between security and simplicity. The patterns in this section are
presented in decreasing order of security.
6.1. Backend For Frontend (BFF)
This section describes the architecture of a browser-based
application that relies on a backend component to handle all OAuth
responsibilities and API interactions. The BFF has three core
responsibilities:
1. The BFF interacts with the authorization server as a confidential
OAuth client (as defined in Section 2.1 of [RFC6749])
2. The BFF manages OAuth access and refresh tokens in the context of
a cookie-based session, avoiding the direct exposure of any
tokens to the browser-based application
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3. The BFF forwards all requests to a resource server, augmenting
them with the correct access token before forwarding them to the
resource server
In this architecture, the BFF runs as a server-side component, but it
is a component of the frontend application. To avoid confusion with
other architectural concepts, such as API gateways and reverse
proxies, it is important to keep in mind that the BFF becomes the
OAuth client for the frontend application.
If an attacker is able to execute malicious code within the browser-
based application, the application architecture is able to withstand
most of the attack scenarios discussed before. Since tokens are only
available to the BFF, there are no tokens available to extract from
the browser (Single-Execution Token Theft (Section 5.1.1) and
Persistent Token Theft (Section 5.1.2)). The BFF is a confidential
client, which prevents the attacker from running a new flow within
the browser (Acquisition and Extraction of New Tokens
(Section 5.1.3)). Since the malicious browser-based code still runs
within the application's origin, the attacker is able to send
requests to the BFF from within the user's browser (Proxying Requests
via the User's Browser (Section 5.1.4)). Note that the use of
HttpOnly cookies prevents the attacker from directly accessing the
session state, which prevents the escalation from client hijacking to
session hijacking.
6.1.1. Application Architecture
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+---------------+ +----------+ +----------+
| | | | | |
| Authorization | | Token | | Resource |
| Endpoint | | Endpoint | | Server |
| | | | | |
+---------------+ +----------+ +----------+
^ ^ ^
| (F)| (K)|
| v v
|
| +------------------------------+
| | |
| | Backend for Frontend (BFF) |
(D)| | |
| +------------------------------+
|
| ^ ^ ^ + ^ +
| (B,I)| (C)| (E)| (G)| (J)| |(L)
v v v + v + v
+-----------------+ +-----------------------------------------+
| | (A,H) | |
| Static Web Host | +-----> | Browser |
| | | |
+-----------------+ +-----------------------------------------+
Figure 1: OAuth 2.0 BFF Pattern
In this architecture, the browser code (typically JavaScript) is
first loaded from a static web host into the browser (A), and the
application then runs in the browser. The application checks with
the BFF if there is an active session by calling a "check session"
API endpoint (B). If an active session is found, the application
resumes its authenticated state and skips forward to step J.
When no active session is found, the browser-based application
triggers a navigation to the BFF (C) to initiate the Authorization
Code flow with the PKCE extension (described in Section 6.1.3.1), to
which the BFF responds by redirecting the browser to the
authorization endpoint (D). When the user is redirected back, the
browser delivers the authorization code to the BFF (E), where the BFF
can then exchange it for tokens at the token endpoint (F) using its
client credentials and PKCE code verifier.
The BFF associates the obtained tokens with the user's session (See
Section 6.1.2.3) and sets a cookie in the response to keep track of
this session (G). At this point, the redirect-based Authorization
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Code flow has been completed, so the BFF can hand control back to the
frontend application. It does so by including a redirect in the
response (G), triggering the browser to fetch the frontend from the
server (H). Note that step (H) is identical to step (A), which
likely means that the requested resources can be loaded from the
browser's cache. When the frontend loads, it will check with the BFF
for an existing session (I), allowing the application to resume its
authenticated state.
When the application in the browser wants to make a request to the
resource server, it sends a request to the corresponding endpoint on
the BFF (J). This request will include the cookie set in step G,
allowing the BFF to obtain the proper tokens for this user's session.
The BFF removes the cookie from the request, attaches the user's
access token to the request, and forwards it to the actual resource
server (K). The BFF then forwards the response back to the browser-
based application (L).
6.1.2. Implementation Details
6.1.2.1. Session and OAuth Endpoints
The BFF provides a set of endpoints that are crucial to implement the
interactions between the browser-based application and the BFF. This
section discusses these endpoints in a bit more detail to clarify
their purpose and use cases.
The "check session" endpoint (Steps B and I in the diagram above) is
an API endpoint called by the browser-based application. The request
will carry session information when available, allowing the BFF to
check for an active session. The response should indicate to the
browser-based application whether the session is active.
Additionally, the BFF can include other information, such as identity
information about the authenticated user.
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The endpoint that initiates the Authorization Code flow (step C) is
contacted by the browser through a navigation. When the application
detects an unauthenticated state after checking the session (step B),
it can navigate the browser to this endpoint. Doing so allows the
BFF to respond with a redirect, which takes the browser to the
authorization server. The endpoint to initiate this flow is
typically included as the "login" endpoint by libraries that support
OAuth 2.0 for confidential clients running on a web server. Note
that it is also possible for the BFF to initiate the Authorization
Code flow in step B, when it detects the absence of an active
session. In that case, the BFF would return the authorization URI in
the response and expect the application to trigger a navigation event
with this URI. However, this scenario requires a custom
implementation and makes it harder to use standard OAuth libraries.
The endpoint that receives the authorization code (step E) is called
by a navigation event from within the browser. At this point, the
application is not loaded and not in a position to handle the
redirect. Similar to the initiation of the flow, the endpoint to
handle the redirect is offered by standard OAuth libraries. The BFF
can respond to this request with a redirect that triggers the browser
to load the application.
Finally, the BFF can also offer a "logout" endpoint to the
application, which is not depicted in the diagram above. The exact
behavior of the logout endpoint depends on the application
requirements. Note that standard OAuth libraries typically also
offer an implementation of the "logout" endpoint.
6.1.2.2. Refresh Tokens
When using refresh tokens, as described in Section 4.14 of [RFC9700],
the BFF obtains the refresh token (step F) and associates it with the
user's session.
If the BFF notices that the user's access token has expired and the
BFF has a refresh token, it can use the refresh token to obtain a
fresh access token. Since the BFF OAuth client is a confidential
client, it will use client authentication on the refresh token
request. Typically, the BFF performs these steps inline when
handling an API call from the frontend. In that case, these steps,
which are not explicitly shown on the diagram, would occur between
steps J and K. BFFs that keep all token information available on the
server side can also request fresh access tokens when they observe a
token expiration event to increase the performance of API requests.
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When the refresh token expires, there is no way to obtain a valid
access token without running an entirely new Authorization Code flow.
Therefore, it makes sense to configure the lifetime of the cookie-
based session managed by the BFF to be equal to the maximum lifetime
of the refresh token. Additionally, when the BFF learns that a
refresh token for an active session is no longer valid, it also makes
sense to invalidate the session.
6.1.2.3. Cookie-based Session State
The BFF relies on browser cookies ([I-D.ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis]) to
keep track of the user's session, which is used to access the user's
tokens. Cookie-based sessions, both server-side and client-side,
have some downsides.
Server-side sessions expose only a session identifier and keep all
data on the server. Doing so ensures a great level of control over
active sessions, along with the possibility to revoke any session at
will. The downside of this approach is the impact on scalability,
requiring solutions such as "sticky sessions", or "session
replication". Given these downsides, using server-side sessions with
a BFF is only recommended in small-scale scenarios.
Client-side sessions push all data to the browser in a signed, and
optionally encrypted, object. This pattern absolves the server of
keeping track of any session data, but severely limits control over
active sessions and makes it difficult to handle session revocation.
However, when client-side sessions are used in the context of a BFF,
these properties change significantly. Since the cookie-based
session is only used to obtain a user's tokens, all control and
revocation properties follow from the use of access tokens and
refresh tokens. It suffices to revoke the user's access token and/or
refresh token to prevent ongoing access to protected resources,
without the need to explicitly invalidate the cookie-based session.
Best practices to secure the session cookie are discussed in
Section 6.1.3.2.
6.1.2.4. Combining OAuth and OpenID Connect
The OAuth flow used by this application architecture can be combined
with OpenID Connect by including the necessary OpenID Connect scopes
in the authorization request (C) (At least the scope openid as
defined in Section 3.1.2.1 of [OpenID]). In that case, the BFF will
receive an ID Token in step F. The BFF can associate the information
from the ID Token with the user's session and provide it to the
application in step B or I.
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When needed, the BFF can use the access token associated with the
user's session to make requests to the UserInfo endpoint.
6.1.2.5. Practical Deployment Strategies
Serving the static JavaScript code is a separate responsibility from
handling OAuth tokens and forwarding requests. In the diagram
presented above, the BFF and static web host are shown as two
separate entities. In real-world deployments, these components can
be deployed as a single service (i.e., the BFF serving the static JS
code), as two separate services (i.e., a CDN and a BFF), or as two
components in a single service (i.e., static hosting and serverless
functions on a cloud platform).
Note that it is possible to further customize this architecture to
tailor to specific scenarios. For example, an application relying on
both internal and external resource servers can choose to host the
internal resource server alongside the BFF. In that scenario,
requests to the internal resource server are handled directly at the
BFF, without the need to forward requests over the network.
Authorization from the point of view of the resource server does not
change, as the user's session is internally translated to the access
token and its claims.
6.1.3. Security Considerations
6.1.3.1. The Authorization Code Grant
The main benefit of using a BFF is the BFF's ability to act as a
confidential client. Therefore, the BFF MUST act as a confidential
client by establishing credentials with the authorization server.
Furthermore, the BFF MUST use the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code grant
as described in Section 2.1.1 of [RFC9700] to initiate a request for
an access token.
6.1.3.2. Cookie Security
The BFF uses cookies to create a user session, which is directly
associated with the user's tokens, either through server-side or
client-side session state. Given the sensitive nature of these
cookies, they must be properly protected.
The following cookie security guidelines are relevant for this
particular BFF architecture:
* The BFF MUST enable the _Secure_ flag for its cookies
* The BFF MUST enable the _HttpOnly_ flag for its cookies
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* The BFF SHOULD enable the _SameSite=Strict_ flag for its cookies
* The BFF SHOULD set its cookie path to _/_
* The BFF SHOULD NOT set the _Domain_ attribute for cookies
* The BFF SHOULD start the name of its cookies with the __Host
prefix ([I-D.ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis])
Note: In new deployments, all of the above requirements are likely to
be straightforward to implement. The "SHOULD" items are only not
"MUSTs" so that existing architectures can be compliant. The
implications of these requirements are listed below.
These cookie security guidelines, combined with the use of HTTPS,
help counter attacks that directly target a cookie-based session.
Session hijacking is not possible, due to the Secure and HttpOnly
cookie flags. The __Host prefix prevents the cookie from being
shared with subdomains, thereby countering subdomain-based session
hijacking or session fixation attacks. In a typical BFF deployment
scenario, there is no reason to use more relaxed cookie security
settings than the requirements listed above. Deviating from these
settings requires proper motivation for the deployment scenario at
hand.
Additionally, when using client-side sessions that contain access
tokens, (as opposed to server-side sessions where the tokens only
live on the server), the BFF SHOULD encrypt its cookie contents.
While the use of cookie encryption does not affect the security
properties of the BFF pattern, it does ensure that tokens stored in
cookies are never written to the user's local persistent storage in
plaintext format. This security measure helps ensure the
confidentiality of the tokens in case an attacker is able to read
cookies from the hard drive. Such an attack can be launched through
malware running on the victim's computer. Note that while encrypting
the cookie contents prevents direct access to embedded tokens, it
still allows the attacker to use the encrypted cookie in a session
hijacking attack.
For further guidance on cookie security best practices, we refer to
the OWASP Cheat Sheet series ([OWASPCheatSheet]).
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6.1.3.3. Cross-Site Request Forgery Protections
The interactions between the browser-based application and the BFF
rely on cookies for authentication and authorization. Similar to
other cookie-based interactions, the BFF is required to account for
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks. A successful CSRF attack
could allow the attacker's request to the BFF to trigger outgoing
calls to a protected resource.
The BFF MUST implement a proper CSRF defense. The exact mechanism or
combination of mechanisms depends on the exact domain where the BFF
is deployed, as discussed below.
6.1.3.3.1. SameSite Cookie Attribute
Configuring the cookies with the _SameSite=Strict_ attribute (See
Section 6.1.3.2) ensures that the BFF's cookies are only included on
same-site requests, and not on potentially malicious cross-site
requests.
This defense is adequate if the BFF is never considered to be same-
site with any other applications. However, it falls short when the
BFF is hosted alongside other applications within the same site,
defined as the eTLD+1 (See this definition of [Site] for more
details).
For example, subdomains, such as https://a.example.com and
https://b.example.com, are considered same-site, since they share the
same site example.com. They are considered cross-origin, since
origins consist of the tuple _<scheme, hostname, port>_. As a result,
a subdomain takeover attack against b.example.com can enable CSRF
attacks against the BFF of a.example.com. Note that these subdomain-
based attacks follow the same pattern as CSRF attacks, but with
cross-origin nature instead of a cross-site nature.
6.1.3.3.2. Cross-Origin Resource Sharing
The BFF can rely on CORS as a CSRF defense mechanism. CORS is a
security mechanism implemented by browsers that restricts cross-
origin requests, unless the server explicitly approves such a request
by setting the proper CORS headers.
Browsers typically restrict cross-origin HTTP requests initiated from
scripts. CORS can remove this restriction if the target server
approves the request, which is checked through an initial "preflight"
request. Unless the preflight response explicitly approves the
request, the browser will refuse to send the full request.
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Because of this property, the BFF can rely on CORS as a CSRF defense.
When the attacker tries to launch a cross-origin request to the BFF
from the user's browser, the BFF will not approve the request in the
preflight response, causing the browser to block the actual request.
Note that the attacker can always launch the request from their own
machine, but then the request will not carry the user's cookies, so
the attack will fail.
When relying on CORS as a CSRF defense, it is important to realize
that certain requests are possible without a preflight. For such
requests, named "CORS-safelisted Requests", the browser will simply
send the request and prevent access to the response if the server did
not send the proper CORS headers. This behavior is enforced for
requests that can be triggered via other means than JavaScript, such
as a GET request or a form-based POST request.
The consequence of this behavior is that certain endpoints of the
resource server could become vulnerable to CSRF, even with CORS
enabled as a defense. For example, if the resource server is an API
that exposes an endpoint to a body-less POST request, there will be
no preflight request and no CSRF defense.
To avoid such bypasses against the CORS policy, the BFF SHOULD
require that the browser-based application includes a custom request
header. Cross-origin requests with a custom request header always
require a preflight, which makes CORS an effective CSRF defense.
When this mechanism is used, the BFF MUST ensure that every incoming
request carries this static header. The exact naming of this header
is at the discretion of the application and BFF. A sample
configuration would be a request header with a static value, such as
My-Static-Header: 1.
It is also possible to deploy the browser-based application on the
same origin as the BFF. This ensures that legitimate interactions
between the frontend and the BFF do not require any preflights, so
there's no additional overhead.
6.1.3.3.3. Use anti-forgery/double submit cookies
Some technology stacks and frameworks have built-in CRSF protection
using anti-forgery cookies. This mechanism relies on a session-
specific secret that is stored in a cookie, which can only be read by
the legitimate frontend running in the domain associated with the
cookie. The frontend is expected to read the cookie and insert its
value into the request, typically by adding a custom request header.
The backend verifies the value in the cookie to the value provided by
the frontend to identify legitimate requests. When implemented
correctly for all state-changing requests, this mechanism effectively
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mitigates CSRF.
Note that this mechanism is not necessarily recommended over the CORS
approach. However, if a framework offers built-in support for this
mechanism, it can serve as a low-effort alternative to protect
against CSRF.
6.1.3.4. Privacy considerations in the BFF architecture
The BFF pattern requires that the browser-based application forwards
all requests to a resource server through a backend BFF component.
As a consequence, the BFF component is able to observe all requests
and responses between the application and a resource server, which
can have a considerable privacy impact.
When the browser-based application and BFF are built and deployed by
the same party, the privacy impact is likely minimal. However, when
this pattern is implemented using a BFF component that is provided or
hosted by a third party, this privacy impact needs to be taken into
account.
6.1.3.5. Operational Considerations
As the BFF is forwarding all requests to the resource server on
behalf of the frontend, care should be taken to ensure the resource
server is aware of this component and uses appropriate policies for
rate limiting and other anti-abuse measures. For example, if the BFF
is deployed as a single-instance service, and the resource server is
rate limiting requests based on IP address, it might start blocking
requests as many users' browsers will appear to be coming from the
single IP address of the BFF.
6.1.3.6. Proxy Restrictions
The BFF acts as a proxy service by accepting requests from the
frontend and forwarding them to the resource server. The inbound
request carries a cookie, which the BFF translates into an access
token on the outbound request. (Note that this makes it more like an
application-layer reverse proxy than an HTTP proxy.) Apart from CSRF
attacks, attackers may attempt to manipulate the BFF into forwarding
requests to unintended hosts. If an attacker successfully exploits
this, they could redirect the BFF to an arbitrary server, potentially
exposing the user's access token.
To mitigate this risk, the BFF MUST enforce strict outbound request
controls by validating destination hosts before forwarding requests.
This requires maintaining an explicit allowlist of approved resource
servers, ensuring that requests are only proxied to predefined
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backends (e.g., /bff/orders/create maps exclusively to https://order-
api.example.com/create). If dynamic routing based on paths (e.g.,
/bff/orders/{id}) is necessary, the BFF MUST apply strict validation
to ensure that only authorized destinations are accessible.
Additionally, restricting the allowed HTTP methods on a per-endpoint
basis can further reduce attack vectors.
When implementing a dynamically configurable proxy, the BFF MUST
ensure that it only allows requests to explicitly permitted hosts and
paths. Failure to enforce these restrictions can lead to
unauthorized access and access token leakage.
6.1.3.7. Advanced Security
In the BFF pattern, all OAuth responsibilities have been moved to the
BFF, a server-side component acting as a confidential client. Since
server-side applications run in a more controlled environment than
browser-based applications, it becomes easier to adopt advanced OAuth
security practices. Examples include key-based client authentication
and sender-constrained tokens.
6.1.4. Threat Analysis
This section revisits the attack scenarios and consequences from
Section 5, and discusses potential additional defenses.
6.1.4.1. Attack Scenarios and Consequences
If the attacker has the ability to execute malicious code (e.g.
JavaScript or WASM) in the application's execution context, the
following attack scenarios become relevant:
* Proxying Requests via the User's Browser (Section 5.1.4)
Note that this attack scenario results in the following consequences:
* Client Hijacking (Section 5.2.3)
Note that client hijacking is an attack scenario that is inherent to
the nature of browser-based applications. As a result, nothing will
be able to prevent such attacks apart from stopping the execution of
malicious code in the first place. Techniques that can help to
achieve this are following secure coding guidelines, code analysis,
and deploying defense-in-depth mechanisms such as Content Security
Policy ([W3C.CSP3]).
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In this architecture, the BFF is a key component handling various
security-specific responsibilities and proxy-based behavior. While
it is out of the scope of this document to discuss a secure
implementation of proxy-based applications, it is crucial to note
that security vulnerabilities in the BFF can have a significant
impact on the application.
Finally, the BFF is uniquely placed to observe all traffic between
the browser-based application and the resource servers. If a high-
security application would prefer to implement anomaly detection or
rate limiting, such a BFF would be the ideal place to do so. Such
restrictions can further help to mitigate the consequences of client
hijacking.
6.1.4.2. Mitigated Attack Scenarios
The other attack scenarios, listed below, are effectively mitigated
by the BFF application architecture:
* Single-Execution Token Theft (Section 5.1.1)
* Persistent Token Theft (Section 5.1.2)
* Acquisition and Extraction of New Tokens (Section 5.1.3)
The BFF counters the first two attack scenarios by not exposing any
tokens to the browser-based application. Even when the attacker
gains full control over the application, there are simply no tokens
to be stolen.
The third scenario, where the attacker obtains a fresh access token
(and optionally refresh token) by running a silent flow, is mitigated
by making the BFF a confidential client. Even when the attacker
manages to obtain an authorization code, they are prevented from
exchanging this code due to the lack of client credentials.
Additionally, the use of PKCE prevents other attacks against the
authorization code.
Since refresh and access tokens are managed by the BFF and not
exposed to the browser, the following two consequences of potential
attacks become irrelevant:
* Exploiting Stolen Refresh Tokens (See Section 5.2.1)
* Exploiting Stolen Access Tokens (See Section 5.2.2)
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6.1.4.3. Summary
The architecture of a BFF is significantly more complicated than a
browser-only application. It requires deploying and operating a
server-side BFF component. Additionally, this pattern requires all
interactions between the application and the resource servers to be
proxied by the BFF. Depending on the deployment pattern, this proxy
behavior can add a significant burden on the server-side components.
See Section 6.2.2.6 for additional notes if the BFF is acting as the
resource server.
However, because of the nature of the BFF architecture pattern, it
offers strong security guarantees. Using a BFF also ensures that the
application's attack surface does not increase by using OAuth. The
only viable attack pattern is hijacking the client application in the
user's browser, a problem inherent to web applications.
This architecture is strongly recommended for business applications,
sensitive applications, and applications that handle personal data.
6.2. Token-Mediating Backend
This section describes the architecture of a browser-based
application that relies on a backend component to handle OAuth
responsibilities for obtaining tokens as a confidential client (as
defined in Section 2.1 of [RFC6749]). The backend component then
provides the application with the access token to directly interact
with resource servers.
The token-mediating backend pattern is more lightweight than the BFF
pattern (See Section 6.1), since it does not require the proxying of
all requests and responses between the application and the resource
server. From a security perspective, the token-mediating backend is
less secure than a BFF, but still offers significant advantages over
an OAuth client application running directly in the browser.
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If an attacker is able to execute malicious code within the
application, the application architecture is able to prevent the
attacker from abusing refresh tokens (Single-Execution Token Theft
(Section 5.1.1) and Persistent Token Theft (Section 5.1.2)) or
obtaining a fresh set of tokens (Acquisition and Extraction of New
Tokens (Section 5.1.3)). However, since the access token is directly
exposed to the application, the attacker can steal the token from
client-side storage (Single-Execution Token Theft (Section 5.1.1) and
Persistent Token Theft (Section 5.1.2)), or request a fresh token
from the token-mediating backend (Proxying Requests via the User's
Browser (Section 5.1.4)). Note that the use of HttpOnly cookies
prevents the attacker from directly accessing the session state,
which prevents the escalation from access token theft to session
hijacking.
6.2.1. Application Architecture
+---------------+ +----------+ +----------+
| | | | | |
| Authorization | | Token | | Resource |
| Endpoint | | Endpoint | | Server |
| | | | | |
+---------------+ +----------+ +----------+
^ ^ ^
| (F)| |
| v |
| |
| +---------------------------+ |
| | | |
| | Token-Mediating Backend | |(J)
(D)| | | |
| +---------------------------+ |
| |
| ^ ^ ^ + |
| (B,I)| (C)| (E)| (G)| |
v v v + v v
+-----------------+ +-----------------------------------------+
| | (A,H) | |
| Static Web Host | +-----> | Browser |
| | | |
+-----------------+ +-----------------------------------------+
Figure 2: OAuth 2.0 Token-Mediating Backend Pattern
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In this architecture, the browser-based code (e.g. JavaScript or
WASM) is first loaded from a static web host into the browser (A),
and the application then runs in the browser. The application checks
with the token-mediating backend if there is an active session (B).
If an active session is found, the application receives the
corresponding access token, resumes its authenticated state, and
skips forward to step J.
When no active session is found, the application triggers a
navigation to the token-mediating backend (C) to initiate the
Authorization Code flow with the PKCE extension (described in
Section 6.2.3.1), to which the token-mediating backend responds by
redirecting the browser to the authorization endpoint (D). When the
user is redirected back, the browser delivers the authorization code
to the token-mediating backend (E), where the token-mediating backend
can then exchange it for tokens at the token endpoint (F) using its
client credentials and PKCE code verifier.
The token-mediating backend associates the obtained tokens with the
user's session (See Section 6.2.2.4) and sets a cookie in the
response to keep track of this session (G). This response to the
browser will also trigger the reloading of the application (H). When
this application reloads, it will check with the token-mediating
backend for an existing session (I), allowing the application to
resume its authenticated state and obtain the access token from the
token-mediating backend.
The application in the browser can use the access token obtained in
step I to directly make requests to the resource server (J).
6.2.2. Implementation Details
6.2.2.1. Session and OAuth Endpoints
Most of the endpoint implementations of the token-mediating backend
are similar to those described for a BFF.
* The "check session" endpoint (Steps B and I in the diagram above)
is an API endpoint called by the browser-based application. The
request will carry session information when available, allowing
the backend to check for an active session. The response should
indicate to the browser-based application whether the session is
active. If an active session is found, the backend includes the
access token in the response. Additionally, the backend can
include other information, such as identity information about the
authenticated user.
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* The endpoint that initiates the Authorization Code flow (step C)
is identical to the endpoint described for the BFF architecture.
See section Section 6.1.2.1 for more details.
* The endpoint that receives the authorization code (step E) is
identical to the endpoint described for the BFF architecture. See
section Section 6.1.2.1 for more details.
* The endpoint that supports logout is identical to the endpoint
described for the BFF architecture. See section Section 6.1.2.1
for more details.
6.2.2.2. Refresh Tokens
When using refresh tokens, as described in Section 4.14 of [RFC9700],
the token-mediating backend obtains the refresh token in step F and
associates it with the user's session.
If the resource server rejects the access token, the application can
contact the token-mediating backend to request a new access token.
The token-mediating backend relies on the cookies associated with
this request to look up the user's refresh token, and makes a token
request using the refresh token. These steps are not shown in the
diagram. Note that this Refresh Token request is from the backend, a
confidential client, and thus requires client authentication.
When the refresh token expires, there is no way to obtain a valid
access token without starting an entirely new Authorization Code
grant. Therefore, it makes sense to configure the lifetime of the
cookie-based session to be equal to the maximum lifetime of the
refresh token if such information is known upfront. Additionally,
when the token-mediating backend learns that a refresh token for an
active session is no longer valid, it makes sense to invalidate the
session.
6.2.2.3. Access Token Scopes
Depending on the resource servers being accessed and the
configuration of scopes at the authorization server, the application
may wish to request access tokens with different scope
configurations. This behavior would allow the application to follow
the best practice of using minimally-scoped access tokens.
The application can inform the token-mediating backend of the desired
scopes when it checks for the active session (Step A/I). It is up to
the token-mediating backend to decide if previously obtained access
tokens fall within the desired scope criteria.
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It should be noted that this access token caching mechanism at the
token-mediating backend can cause scope elevation risks when applied
indiscriminately. If the cached access token features a superset of
the scopes requested by the frontend, the token-mediating backend
SHOULD NOT return it to the frontend; instead, it SHOULD use the
refresh token to request an access token with the smaller set of
scopes from the authorization server. Note that support of such an
access token downscoping mechanism is at the discretion of the
authorization server.
The token-mediating backend can use a similar mechanism to
downscoping when relying on [RFC8707] to obtain access token for a
specific resource server.
6.2.2.4. Cookie-based Session State
Similar to the BFF, the token-mediating backend relies on browser
cookies to keep track of the user's session. The same implementation
guidelines and security considerations as for a BFF apply, as
discussed in Section 6.1.2.3.
6.2.2.5. Combining OAuth and OpenID Connect
Similar to a BFF, the token-mediating backend can choose to combine
OAuth and OpenID Connect in a single flow. See Section 6.1.2.4 for
more details.
6.2.2.6. Practical Deployment Scenarios
Serving the static JavaScript or WASM code is a separate
responsibility from handling interactions with the authorization
server. In the diagram presented above, the token-mediating backend
and static web host are shown as two separate entities. In real-
world deployment scenarios, these components can be deployed as a
single service (i.e., the token-mediating backend serving the static
code), as two separate services (i.e., a CDN and a token-mediating
backend), or as two components in a single service (i.e., static
hosting and serverless functions on a cloud platform). These
deployment differences do not affect the relationships described in
this pattern, but may impact other practicalities, such as the need
to properly configure CORS to enable cross-origin communication.
6.2.3. Security Considerations
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6.2.3.1. The Authorization Code Grant
The main benefit of using a token-mediating backend is the backend's
ability to act as a confidential client. Therefore, the token-
mediating backend MUST act as a confidential client. Furthermore,
the token-mediating backend MUST use the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code
grant as described in Section 2.1.1 of [RFC9700] to initiate a
request for an access token.
6.2.3.2. Cookie Security
The token-mediating backend uses cookies to create a user session,
which is directly associated with the user's tokens, either through
server-side or client-side session state. The same cookie security
guidelines as for a BFF apply, as discussed in Section 6.1.3.2.
6.2.3.3. Cross-Site Request Forgery Protections
The interactions between the browser-based application and the token-
mediating backend rely on cookies for authentication and
authorization. Just like a BFF, the token-mediating backend is
required to account for Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks.
Section 6.1.3.3 outlines the nuances of various mitigation strategies
against CSRF attacks. Specifically for a token-mediating backend,
these CSRF defenses only apply to the endpoint or endpoints where the
application can obtain its access tokens.
6.2.3.4. Advanced OAuth Security
The token-mediating backend is a confidential client running as a
server-side component. The token-mediating backend can adopt
security best practices for confidential clients, such as key-based
client authentication.
6.2.4. Threat Analysis
This section revisits the attack scenarios and consequences from
Section 5, and discusses potential additional defenses.
6.2.4.1. Attack Scenarios and Consequences
If the attacker has the ability to execute malicious code in the
application's execution context, the following attack scenarios
become relevant:
* Single-Execution Token Theft (Section 5.1.1) for access tokens
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* Persistent Token Theft (Section 5.1.2) for access tokens
* Proxying Requests via the User's Browser (Section 5.1.4)
Note that these attack scenarios result in the following
consequences:
* Exploiting Stolen Access Tokens (Section 5.2.2)
* Client Hijacking (Section 5.2.3)
Exposing the access token to the browser-based application is the
core idea behind the architecture pattern of the token-mediating
backend. As a result, the access token becomes vulnerable to token
theft by malicious browser-based code.
6.2.4.2. Mitigated Attack Scenarios
The other attack scenarios, listed below, are effectively mitigated
by the token-mediating backend:
* Single-Execution Token Theft (Section 5.1.1) for refresh tokens
* Persistent Token Theft (Section 5.1.2) for refresh tokens
* Acquisition and Extraction of New Tokens (Section 5.1.3)
The token-mediating backend counters the first two attack scenarios
by not exposing the refresh token to the browser-based application.
Even when the attacker gains full control over the application, there
are simply no refresh tokens to be stolen.
The third scenario, where the attacker obtains a fresh access token
(and optionally refresh token) by running a silent flow, is mitigated
by making the token-mediating backend a confidential client. Even
when the attacker manages to obtain an authorization code, they are
prevented from exchanging this code due to the lack of client
credentials. Additionally, the use of PKCE prevents other attacks
against the authorization code.
Because of the nature of the token-mediating backend, the following
consequences of potential attacks become irrelevant:
* Exploiting Stolen Refresh Tokens (See Section 5.2.1)
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6.2.4.3. Additional Defenses
While this architecture inherently exposes access tokens, there are
some additional defenses that can help to increase the security
posture of the application.
6.2.4.3.1. Secure Token Storage
Given the nature of the token-mediating backend pattern, there is no
need for persistent token storage in the browser. When needed, the
application can always use its cookie-based session to obtain an
access token from the token-mediating backend. Section 8 provides
more details on the security properties of various storage mechanisms
in the browser.
Be aware that even when the access token is stored out of reach of
malicious browser-based code, the malicious code can still mimic the
legitimate application and send a request to the token-mediation
backend to obtain the latest access token.
6.2.4.3.2. Using Sender-Constrained Tokens
Using sender-constrained access tokens is not trivial in this
architecture. The token-mediating backend is responsible for
exchanging an authorization code or refresh token for an access
token, but the application will use the access token. Using a
mechanism such as DPoP [RFC9449] would require splitting
responsibilities over two parties, which is not a scenario defined by
the specification. Use of DPoP in such a scenario is out of the
scope of this document.
6.2.4.4. Summary
The architecture of a token-mediating backend is more complicated
than a browser-only application, but less complicated than running a
proxying BFF. Similar to complexity, the security properties offered
by the token-mediating backend lie somewhere between using a BFF and
running a browser-only application.
A token-mediating backend addresses typical scenarios that grant the
attacker long-term access on behalf of the user. However, due to the
consequence of access token theft, the attacker still has the ability
to gain direct access to resource servers.
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When considering a token-mediating backend architecture, it is
strongly recommended to evaluate if adopting a full BFF as discussed
in Section 6.1 is a viable alternative. Only when the use cases or
system requirements would prevent the use of a proxying BFF should
the token-mediating backend be considered over a full BFF.
6.3. Browser-based OAuth 2.0 client
This section describes the architecture of a browser-based
application that acts as the OAuth client, handling all OAuth
responsibilities in the browser. As a result, the browser-based
application obtains tokens from the authorization server, without the
involvement of a backend component.
If an attacker is able to execute malicious code in the browser, this
application architecture is vulnerable to all attack scenarios
discussed earlier (Section 5.1). In essence, the attacker will be
able to obtain access tokens and refresh tokens from the
authorization server, potentially giving them long-term access to
protected resources on behalf of the user.
6.3.1. Application Architecture
+---------------+ +--------------+
| | | |
| Authorization | | Resource |
| Server | | Server |
| | | |
+---------------+ +--------------+
^ ^ ^ +
| | | |
|(B) |(C) |(D) |(E)
| | | |
| | | |
+ v + v
+-----------------+ +-------------------------------+
| | (A) | |
| Static Web Host | +-----> | Browser |
| | | |
+-----------------+ +-------------------------------+
Figure 3: Browser-based OAuth 2.0 Client Pattern
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In this architecture, the code is first loaded from a static web host
into the browser (A), and the application then runs in the browser.
In this scenario, the browser-based application is considered a
public client, which does not possess client credentials to
authenticate to the authorization server.
The application obtains an authorization code (B) by initiating the
Authorization Code flow with the PKCE extension (described in
Section 6.3.2.1). The application uses a browser API (e.g. [Fetch])
to make a POST request to the token endpoint (C) to exchange the
authorization code for tokens.
The application is then responsible for storing the access token and
optional refresh token as securely as possible using appropriate
browser APIs, described in Section 8.
When the application in the browser wants to make a request to the
resource server, it can interact with the resource server directly.
The application includes the access token in the request (D) and
receives the resource server's response (E).
6.3.2. Implementation Details
Browser-based applications that are public clients (Section 2.1 of
[RFC6749]) and use the Authorization Code grant type described in
Section 4.1 of [RFC6749] MUST also follow these additional
requirements described in this section.
6.3.2.1. The Authorization Code Grant
Browser-based applications that are public clients MUST implement the
Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE [RFC7636]) extension when obtaining
an access token, and authorization servers MUST support and enforce
PKCE for such clients.
The PKCE extension prevents an attack where the authorization code is
intercepted and exchanged for an access token by a malicious client,
by providing the authorization server with a way to verify the client
instance that exchanges the authorization code is the same one that
initiated the flow.
6.3.2.2. Cross-Site Request Forgery Protections
Browser-based applications MUST prevent CSRF attacks against their
redirect URI. This can be accomplished by any of the below:
* configuring the authorization server to require PKCE for this
client
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* using and verifying unique value for the OAuth state parameter to
carry a CSRF token
* if the application is also using OpenID Connect, by using and
verifying the OpenID Connect nonce parameter as described in
[OpenID]
See Section 2.1 of [RFC9700] for additional details on selecting a
proper CSRF defense for the Authorization Code flow.
6.3.2.3. Refresh Tokens
For browser-based clients, the refresh token is typically a bearer
token, unless the application explicitly uses DPoP [RFC9449]. As a
result, the risk of a leaked refresh token is greater than leaked
access tokens, since an attacker may be able to continue using the
stolen refresh token to obtain new access tokens potentially without
being detectable by the authorization server.
Authorization servers may choose whether or not to issue refresh
tokens to browser-based applications. However, in light of the
impact of third-party cookie-blocking mechanisms, the use of refresh
tokens has become significantly more attractive. [RFC9700] describes
some additional requirements around refresh tokens on top of the
recommendations of [RFC6749]. Applications and authorization servers
conforming to this BCP MUST also follow the recommendations in
[RFC9700] around refresh tokens if refresh tokens are issued to
browser-based applications.
In particular, authorization servers:
* MUST either rotate refresh tokens on each use OR use sender-
constrained refresh tokens as described in Section 4.14.2 of
[RFC9700]
* MUST either set a maximum lifetime on refresh tokens OR expire if
the refresh token has not been used within some amount of time
* upon issuing a rotated refresh token, MUST NOT extend the lifetime
of the new refresh token beyond the lifetime of the initial
refresh token if the refresh token has a preestablished expiration
time
Limiting the overall refresh token lifetime to the lifetime of the
initial refresh token ensures a stolen refresh token cannot be used
indefinitely.
For example:
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* A user authorizes an application, issuing an access token that
lasts 10 minutes, and a refresh token that lasts 8 hours
* After 10 minutes, the initial access token expires, so the
application uses the refresh token to get a new access token
* The authorization server returns a new access token that lasts 10
minutes, and a new refresh token that lasts 7 hours and 50 minutes
* This continues until 8 hours pass from the initial authorization
* At this point, when the application attempts to use the refresh
token after 8 hours, the request will fail and the application
will have to re-initiate an Authorization Code flow that relies on
the user's authentication or previously established session
Authorization servers SHOULD link the lifetime of the refresh token
to the user's authenticated session with the authorization server.
Doing so ensures that when a user logs out, previously issued refresh
tokens to browser-based applications become invalid, mimicking a
single-logout scenario. Authorization servers MAY set different
policies around refresh token issuance, lifetime and expiration for
browser-based applications compared to other public clients.
6.3.3. Security Considerations
6.3.3.1. Client Authentication
Since a browser-based application's source code is delivered to the
end-user's browser, it is unfit to contain provisioned secrets. As a
consequence, browser-based applications are typically deployed as
public clients as defined by Section 2.1 of [RFC6749].
Secrets that are statically included as part of an app distributed to
multiple users should not be treated as confidential secrets, as one
user may inspect their copy and learn the shared secret. For this
reason, and those stated in Section 5.3.1 of [RFC6819], authorization
servers MUST NOT require client authentication of browser-based
applications using a shared secret, as this serves no value beyond
client identification which is already provided by the client_id
parameter.
Authorization servers that still require a statically included shared
secret for SPA clients MUST treat the client as a public client, and
not accept the secret as proof of the client's identity. Without
additional measures, such clients are subject to client impersonation
(see Section 6.3.3.2 below).
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6.3.3.2. Client Impersonation
As stated in Section 10.2 of [RFC6749], the authorization server
SHOULD NOT process authorization requests automatically without user
consent or interaction, except when the authorization server can
assure the identity of the client application.
If authorization servers restrict redirect URIs to a fixed set of
absolute HTTPS URIs, preventing the use of wildcard domains, wildcard
paths, or wildcard query string components, this exact match of
registered absolute HTTPS URIs MAY be accepted by authorization
servers as proof of identity of the client for the purpose of
deciding whether to automatically process an authorization request
when a previous request for the client_id has already been approved.
6.3.3.2.1. Authorization Code Redirect
Clients MUST register one or more redirect URIs with the
authorization server, and use only exact registered redirect URIs in
the authorization request.
Authorization servers MUST require an exact match of a registered
redirect URI as described in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC9700]. This helps
to prevent attacks targeting the authorization code.
6.3.3.3. Security of In-Browser Communication Flows
In browser-based applications, it is common to execute the OAuth flow
in a secondary window, such as a popup or iframe, instead of
redirecting the primary window. In these flows, the browser-based
app holds control of the primary window, for instance, to avoid page
refreshes or to run frame-based flows silently.
If the browser-based app and the authorization server are invoked in
different frames, they have to use in-browser communication
techniques like the postMessage API (a.k.a. [WebMessaging]) instead
of top-level redirections. To guarantee confidentiality and
authenticity of messages, both the initiator origin and receiver
origin of a postMessage MUST be verified using the mechanisms
inherently provided by the postMessage API (Section 9.3.2 in
[WebMessaging]).
Section 4.18 of [RFC9700] provides additional details about the
security of in-browser communication flows and the countermeasures
that browser-based applications and authorization servers MUST apply
to defend against these attacks.
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6.3.3.4. Cross-Origin Requests
In this scenario, the application uses a browser API to send requests
to the authorization server and the resource server. Given the
nature of OAuth 2.0, these requests are typically cross-origin,
subjecting them to browser-enforced restrictions on cross-origin
communication. The authorization server and the resource server MUST
send necessary CORS headers (defined in [Fetch]) to enable the
application to make the necessary cross-origin requests. Note that
in the extraordinary scenario where the browser-based OAuth client
runs in the same origin as the authorization server or resource
server, a CORS policy is not needed to enable the necessary
interaction.
For the authorization server, the CORS configuration is relevant for
the token endpoint, where the browser-based application exchanges the
authorization code for tokens. Additionally, if the authorization
server provides additional endpoints to the application, such as
discovery metadata URLs, JSON Web Key Sets, dynamic client
registration, revocation, introspection or user info endpoints, these
endpoints may also be accessed by the browser-based application.
Consequentially, the authorization server is responsible for
supporting CORS on these endpoints.
This specification does not include guidelines for deciding the
concrete CORS policy implementation, which can consist of a wildcard
origin or a more restrictive configuration. Note that CORS has two
modes of operation with different security properties. The first
mode applies to CORS-safelisted requests, formerly known as simple
requests, where the browser sends the request and uses the CORS
response headers to decide if the response can be exposed to the
client-side execution context. For non-CORS-safelisted requests,
such as a request with a custom request header, the browser will
first check the CORS policy using a preflight. The browser will only
send the actual request when the server sends its approval in the
preflight response.
Note that due to the authorization server's specific configuration,
it is possible that the CORS response to a preflight is different
from the CORS response to the actual request. During the preflight,
the authorization server can only verify the provided origin, but
during an actual request, the authorization server has the full
request data, such as the client ID. Consequentially, the
authorization server can approve a known origin during the preflight,
but reject the actual request after comparing the origin to this
specific client's list of pre-registered origins.
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6.3.4. Threat Analysis
This section revisits the attack scenarios and consequences from
Section 5, and discusses potential additional defenses.
6.3.4.1. Attack Scenarios and Consequences
If the attacker has the ability to execute malicious code in the
application's execution context, the following attack scenarios
become relevant:
* Single-Execution Token Theft (Section 5.1.1)
* Persistent Token Theft (Section 5.1.2)
* Acquisition and Extraction of New Tokens (Section 5.1.3)
* Proxying Requests via the User's Browser (Section 5.1.4)
The most dangerous attack scenario is the acquisition and extraction
of new tokens. In this attack scenario, the attacker only interacts
with the authorization server, which makes the actual implementation
details of the OAuth functionality in the client irrelevant. Even if
the legitimate client application finds a way to completely isolate
the tokens from the attacker, the attacker will still be able to
obtain tokens from the authorization server.
Note that these attack scenarios result in the following
consequences:
* Exploiting Stolen Refresh Tokens (See Section 5.2.1)
* Exploiting Stolen Access Tokens (See Section 5.2.2)
* Client Hijacking (See Section 5.2.3)
6.3.4.2. Additional Defenses
While this architecture is inherently vulnerable to malicious
browser-based code, there are some additional defenses that can help
to increase the security posture of the application. Note that none
of these defenses address or fix the underlying problem that allows
the attacker to run a new flow to obtain tokens.
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6.3.4.2.1. Secure Token Storage
When handling tokens directly, the application can choose different
storage mechanisms to store access tokens and refresh tokens.
Universally accessible storage areas, such as _Local Storage_
[WebStorage], are easier to access from malicious JavaScript than
more isolated storage areas, such as a _Web Worker_ [WebWorker].
Section 8 discusses different storage mechanisms with their trade-off
in more detail.
A practical implementation pattern can use a Web Worker [WebWorker]
to isolate the refresh token, and provide the application with the
access token making requests to resource servers. This prevents an
attacker from using the application's refresh token to obtain new
tokens.
However, even a token storage mechanism that completely isolates the
tokens from the attacker does not prevent the attacker from running a
new flow to obtain a fresh set of tokens (See Section 5.1.3).
6.3.4.2.2. Using Sender-Constrained Tokens
Browser-based OAuth clients can implement DPoP [RFC9449] to
transition from bearer access tokens and bearer refresh tokens to
sender-constrained tokens. In such an implementation, the private
key used to sign DPoP proofs is handled by the browser (a non-
extractable [CryptoKeyPair] is stored using [W3C.IndexedDB]). As a
result, the use of DPoP effectively prevents scenarios where the XSS
attacker exfiltrates the application's tokens (See Section 5.1.1 and
Section 5.1.2).
Note that the use of DPoP does not prevent the attacker from running
a new flow to obtain a fresh access token (and optionally refresh
token) Section 5.1.3. Even when DPoP is mandatory, the attacker can
bind the fresh set of tokens to a key pair under their control,
allowing them to exfiltrate the sender-constrained tokens and use
them by relying on the attacker-controlled key to calculate the
necessary DPoP proofs.
6.3.4.2.3. Restricting Access to the Authorization Server
The scenario where the attacker obtains a fresh access token and
(optionally refresh token) Section 5.1.3 relies on the ability to
directly interact with the authorization server from within the
browser. In theory, a defense that prevents the attacker from
silently interacting with the authorization server could solve the
most dangerous attack scenario. However, in practice, such defenses
are ineffective or impractical.
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For completeness, this BCP lists a few options below. Note that none
of these defenses is recommended, as they do not offer practically
usable security benefits.
The authorization server could block authorization requests that
originate from within an iframe. While this would prevent the exact
scenario from Section 5.1.3, it would not work for slight variations
of the attack scenario. For example, the attacker can launch the
silent flow in a popup window, or a pop-under window. Additionally,
browser-only OAuth clients typically rely on a hidden iframe-based
flow to bootstrap the user's authentication state, so this approach
would significantly impact the user experience.
The authorization server could opt to make user consent mandatory in
every Authorization Code flow (as described in Section 10.2 of
[RFC6749]), thus requiring user interaction before issuing an
authorization code. This approach would make it harder for an
attacker to run a silent flow to obtain a fresh set of tokens.
However, it also significantly impacts the user experience by
continuously requiring consent. As a result, this approach would
result in "consent fatigue", which makes it likely that the user will
blindly approve the consent, even when it is associated with a flow
that was initiated by the attacker.
6.3.4.3. Summary
To summarize, the architecture of a browser-based OAuth client
application is straightforward, but results in a significant increase
in the attack surface of the application. The attacker is not only
able to hijack the client, but also to extract a full-featured set of
tokens from the browser-based application.
This architecture is not recommended for business applications,
sensitive applications, and applications that handle personal data.
7. Discouraged and Deprecated Architecture Patterns
Client applications and backend applications have evolved
significantly over the last two decades, along with threats, attacker
models, and a general understanding of modern application security.
As a result, previous recommendations generally accepted in the
industry as well as published by the OAuth Working Group are often no
longer recommended, and proposed solutions often fall short of
meeting the expected security requirements.
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This section discusses a few alternative architecture patterns, which
are not recommended for use in modern browser-based OAuth
applications. This section discusses each of the patterns, along
with a threat analysis that investigates the attack scenarios and
consequences when relevant.
7.1. Single-Domain Browser-Based Applications (not using OAuth)
Too often, simple applications are made needlessly complex by using
OAuth to replace the concept of session management. A typical
example is the modern incarnation of a server-side MVC application,
which now consists of a browser-based frontend backed by a server-
side API.
In such an application, the use of OpenID connect to offload user
authentication to a dedicated provider can significantly simplify the
application's architecture and development. However, the use of
OAuth for governing access between the frontend and the backend is
often not needed. Instead of using access tokens, the application
can rely on traditional cookie-based session state to keep track of
the user's authentication status. The security guidelines to protect
the session cookie are discussed in Section 6.1.3.2.
While the advice to not use OAuth seems out-of-place in this
document, it is important to note that OAuth was originally created
for third-party or federated access to APIs, so it may not be the
best solution in a single common-domain deployment. That said, there
are still some advantages in using OAuth even in a common-domain
architecture:
* Allows more flexibility in the future, such as if you were to
later add a new domain to the system. With OAuth already in
place, adding a new domain wouldn't require any additional
rearchitecting.
* Being able to take advantage of existing library support rather
than writing bespoke code for the integration.
* Centralizing login and multi-factor authentication support,
account management, and recovery at the OAuth server, rather than
making it part of the application logic.
* Splitting of responsibilities between authenticating a user and
serving resources
Using OAuth for browser-based applications in a first-party same-
domain scenario provides these advantages, and can be accomplished by
any of the architectural patterns described above.
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7.1.1. Threat Analysis
Due to the lack of using OAuth, this architecture pattern is only
vulnerable to the following attack scenarios: Proxying Requests via
the User's Browser (Section 5.1.4). As a result, this pattern can
lead to the following consequence: Client Hijacking (Section 5.2.3)
7.2. OAuth Implicit Grant
The OAuth 2.0 Implicit grant type (defined in Section 4.2 of
[RFC6749]) works by the authorization server issuing an access token
in the authorization response (front channel) without an
authorization code exchange step. In this case, the access token is
returned in the fragment part of the redirect URI, providing an
attacker with several opportunities to intercept and steal the access
token.
The security properties of the Implicit grant type make it no longer
a recommended best practice. To effectively prevent the use of this
flow, the authorization server MUST NOT issue access tokens in the
authorization response, and MUST issue access tokens only from the
token endpoint. Browser-based clients MUST use the Authorization
Code grant type and MUST NOT use the Implicit grant type to obtain
access tokens.
7.2.1. Historic Note
Historically, the Implicit grant type provided an advantage to
browser-based applications since JavaScript could always arbitrarily
read and manipulate the fragment portion of the URL without
triggering a page reload. This was necessary in order to remove the
access token from the URL after it was obtained by the app.
Additionally, until CORS was widespread in browsers, the Implicit
grant type offered an alternative flow that didn't require CORS
support in the browser or on the server.
Modern browsers now have the Session History API (described in
"Session history and navigation" of [HTML]), which provides a
mechanism to modify the path and query string component of the URL
without triggering a page reload. Additionally, CORS has widespread
support and is often used by single-page applications for many
purposes. This means modern browser-based applications can use the
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code grant type with PKCE, since they have
the ability to remove the authorization code from the query string
without triggering a page reload thanks to the Session History API,
and CORS support at the token endpoint means the app can obtain
tokens even if the authorization server is on a different domain.
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7.2.2. Threat Analysis
The architecture pattern discussed in this section is vulnerable to
the following attack scenarios:
* Single-Execution Token Theft Section 5.1.1
* Persistent Token Theft Section 5.1.2
* Acquisition and Extraction of New Tokens Section 5.1.3
* Proxying Requests via the User's Browser Section 5.1.4
As a result, this pattern can lead to the following consequences:
* Exploiting Stolen Refresh Tokens Section 5.2.1
* Exploiting Stolen Access Tokens Section 5.2.2
* Client Hijacking Section 5.2.3
7.2.3. Further Attacks on the Implicit Grant
Apart from the attack scenarios and consequences that were already
discussed, there are a few additional attacks that further support
the deprecation of the Implicit grant type. Many attacks on the
Implicit grant type described by [RFC6819] and Section 4.1.2 of
[RFC9700] do not have sufficient mitigation strategies. The
following sections describe the specific attacks that cannot be
mitigated while continuing to use the Implicit grant type.
7.2.3.1. Manipulation of the Redirect URI
If an attacker is able to cause the authorization response to be sent
to a URI under their control, they will directly get access to the
authorization response including the access token. Several methods
of performing this attack are described in detail in [RFC9700].
7.2.3.2. Access Token Leak in Browser History
An attacker could obtain the access token from the browser's history.
The countermeasures recommended by [RFC6819] are limited to using
short expiration times for tokens, and indicating that browsers
should not cache the response. Neither of these fully prevent this
attack, they only reduce the potential damage.
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Additionally, many browsers now also sync browser history to cloud
services and to multiple devices, providing an even wider attack
surface to extract access tokens out of the URL.
This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.2 of [RFC9700].
7.2.3.3. Manipulation of Scripts
An attacker could modify the page or inject scripts into the browser
through various means, including when the browser's HTTPS connection
is being intercepted by, for example, a corporate network. While
attacks on the TLS layer are typically out of scope of basic security
recommendations to prevent, in the case of browser-based applications
they are much easier to perform. An injected script can enable an
attacker to have access to everything on the page.
The risk of a malicious script running on the page may be amplified
when the application uses a known standard way of obtaining access
tokens, namely that the attacker can always look at the
window.location variable to find an access token. This threat
profile is different from an attacker specifically targeting an
individual application by knowing where or how an access token
obtained via the Authorization Code flow may end up being stored.
7.2.3.4. Access Token Leak to Third-Party Scripts
It is relatively common to use third-party scripts in browser-based
applications, such as analytics tools, crash reporting, and even
things like a social media "like" button. In these situations, the
author of the application may not be able to be fully aware of the
entirety of the code running in the application. When an access
token is returned in the fragment, it is visible to any third-party
scripts on the page.
7.2.4. Disadvantages of the Implicit Grant
There are several additional reasons the Implicit grant type is
disadvantageous compared to using the recommended Authorization Code
grant type.
* OAuth 2.0 provides no mechanism for a client to verify that a
particular access token was intended for that client, which could
lead to misuse and possible impersonation attacks if a malicious
party hands off an access token it retrieved through some other
means to the client.
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* Returning an access token in the front-channel redirect gives the
authorization server no assurance that the access token will
actually end up at the application, since there are many ways this
redirect may fail or be intercepted.
* Supporting the Implicit grant type requires additional code, more
upkeep and understanding of the related security considerations.
Limiting the authorization server to just the Authorization Code
grant type reduces the attack surface of the implementation.
* If the browser-based application gets wrapped into a native app,
then [RFC8252] also requires the use of the Authorization Code
grant type with PKCE anyway.
7.3. Resource Owner Password Grant
The Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant MUST NOT be used, as
described in Section 2.4 of [RFC9700]. Instead, using the
Authorization Code grant type and redirecting the user to the
authorization server provides the authorization server the
opportunity to prompt the user for secure non-phishable
authentication options, take advantage of single sign-on sessions, or
use third-party identity providers. In contrast, the Resource Owner
Password Credentials Grant does not provide any built-in mechanism
for these, and would instead need to be extended with custom
protocols.
To conform to this best practice, browser-based applications using
OAuth or OpenID Connect MUST use a redirect-based flow (e.g. the
OAuth Authorization Code grant type) as described in this document.
7.4. Handling the OAuth Flow in a Service Worker
In an attempt to limit the attacker's ability to extract existing
tokens or acquire a new set of tokens, a pattern using a Service
Worker ([W3C.service-workers]) has been suggested in the past. In
this pattern, the application's first action upon loading is
registering a Service Worker. The Service Worker becomes responsible
for executing the Authorization Code flow to obtain tokens and to
augment outgoing requests to the resource server with the proper
access token. Additionally, the Service Worker blocks the client
application's code from making direct calls to the authorization
server's endpoints. This restriction aims to target the attack
scenario "Acquisition and Extraction of New Tokens" (Section 5.1.3).
The sequence diagram included below illustrates the interactions
between the client, the Service Worker, the authorization server, and
the resource server.
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Service Resource Authorization
User Application Worker Server Server
| | | | |
| browse | | | |
|----------->| | | |
| |----------->| | /authorize |
| | |---------------------------------->|
| | | redirect w/ authorization code |
| | |< - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|
| | | | |
| | | token request | |
| | | w/ auth code | /token |
| | |---------------------------------->|
| | |< - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|
| | | | |
| | resource | | |
| | request | | |
| |----------->| | |
| | | resource request | |
| | | w/ access token | |
| | |------------------->| |
| | | | |
User Application Service Resource Authorization
Worker Server Server
Figure 4: OAuth 2.0 Service Worker Pattern
Note that this pattern never exposes the tokens to the application
running in the browser. Since the Service Worker runs in an isolated
execution environment, there is no shared memory and no way for the
client application to influence the execution of the Service Worker.
7.4.1. Threat Analysis
The architecture pattern discussed in this section is vulnerable to
the following attack scenarios:
* Acquisition and Extraction of New Tokens Section 5.1.3
* Proxying Requests via the User's Browser Section 5.1.4
As a result, this pattern can lead to the following consequences:
* Exploiting Stolen Refresh Tokens Section 5.2.1
* Exploiting Stolen Access Tokens Section 5.2.2
* Client Hijacking Section 5.2.3
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7.4.1.1. Attacking the Service Worker
The seemingly promising security benefits of using a Service Worker
warrant a more detailed discussion of its security limitations. To
fully protect the application against the relevant attack scenarios
(Section 5.1), the Service Worker needs to meet two security
requirements:
1. Prevent an attacker from exfiltrating tokens
2. Prevent an attacker from acquiring a new set of tokens
Once registered, the Service Worker runs an Authorization Code flow
and obtains the tokens. Since the Service Worker keeps track of
tokens in its own isolated execution environment, they are out of
reach for any application code, including potentially malicious code.
Consequentially, the Service Worker meets the first requirement of
preventing token exfiltration. This essentially neutralizes the
first two attack scenarios discussed in Section 5.1.
To meet the second security requirement, the Service Worker must be
able to guarantee that an attacker controlling the legitimate
application cannot execute a new Authorization Code grant, an attack
discussed in Section 5.1.3. Due to the nature of Service Workers,
the registered Service Worker will be able to block all outgoing
requests that initiate such a new flow, even when they occur in a
frame or a new window.
However, the malicious code running inside the application can
unregister this Service Worker. Unregistering a Service Worker can
have a significant functional impact on the application, so it is not
an operation the browser handles lightly. Therefore, an unregistered
Service Worker is marked as such, but all currently running instances
remain active until their corresponding browsing context is
terminated (e.g., by closing the tab or window). So even when an
attacker unregisters a Service Worker, it remains active and able to
prevent the attacker from reaching the authorization server.
One of the consequences of unregistering a Service Worker is that it
will not be present when a new browsing context is opened. So when
the attacker first unregisters the Service Worker, and then starts a
new flow in a frame, there will be no Service Worker associated with
the browsing context of the frame. Consequentially, the attacker
will be able to run its own new Authorization Code grant, extract the
authorization code from the frame's URL, and exchange it for tokens.
In essence, the Service Worker fails to meet the second security
requirement, leaving it vulnerable to the scenario where the attacker
acquires a new set of tokens (Section 5.1.3).
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Due to these shortcomings, combined with the significant complexity
of registering and maintaining a Service Worker, this pattern is not
recommended.
Finally, note that the use of a Service Worker by itself does not
increase the attack surface of the application. In practice, Service
Workers are often used to retrofit a legacy application with support
for including OAuth access tokens on outgoing requests. The Service
Worker in these scenarios does not change the security properties of
the application, but merely simplifies development and maintenance of
the application.
8. Token Storage in the Browser
When a browser-based application handles OAuth access tokens or
refresh tokens directly, it becomes responsible for ephemerally or
persistently storing the tokens. As a consequence, the application
needs to decide how to manage the tokens (e.g., in-memory vs
persistent storage), and which steps to take to further isolate the
tokens from the main application code. This section discusses a few
different storage mechanisms and their properties. These
recommendations take into account the unique properties of OAuth
tokens, some of which may overlap with general browser security
recommendations.
When discussing the security properties of browser-based token
storage solutions, it is important to understand the attacker's
capabilities when they compromise a browser-based application.
Similar to previous discussions, two main attack scenarios should be
taken into account:
1. The attacker obtaining tokens from storage
2. The attacker obtaining tokens from the provider (e.g., the
authorization server or the token-mediating backend)
Since the attacker's code becomes indistinguishable from the
legitimate application's code, the attacker will always be able to
request tokens from the provider in exactly the same way as the
legitimate application code. As a result, not even a completely
isolated token storage solution can address the dangers of the second
threat, where the attacker requests tokens from the provider.
That said, the different security properties of browser-based storage
solutions will impact the attacker's ability to obtain existing
tokens from storage.
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8.1. Cookies
Browser cookies are both a storage mechanism and a transport
mechanism. The browser automatically supports both through the
corresponding request and response headers, resulting in the storage
of cookies in the browser and the automatic inclusion of cookies on
outgoing requests given it matches the cookie's domain, path, or
other properties.
Next to header-based control over cookies, browsers also offer a
JavaScript Cookie API to get and set cookies. This Cookie API is
often mistaken as an easy way to store data in the browser. In such
a scenario, the JavaScript code stores a token in a cookie, with the
intent to retrieve the token for later inclusion in the Authorization
header of an API call. However, since the cookie is associated with
the domain of the browser-based application, the browser will also
send the cookie containing the token when making a request to the
server running on this domain. One example of such a request is the
browser loading the application after a previous visit to the
application (step A in the diagram of Section 6.3).
Because of these unintentional side effects of using cookies for
JavaScript-based storage, this practice is NOT RECOMMENDED.
Note that this practice is different from the use of cookies in a BFF
(discussed in Section 6.1.3.2), where the cookie is inaccessible to
JavaScript and is intended to be sent to the backend.
8.2. Token Storage in a Service Worker
A Service Worker ([W3C.service-workers]) offers a fully isolated
environment to keep track of tokens. These tokens are inaccessible
to the client application, effectively protecting them against
exfiltration. To guarantee the security of these tokens, the Service
Worker cannot share these tokens with the application.
Consequentially, whenever the application wants to perform an
operation with a token, it has to ask the Service Worker to perform
this operation and return the result.
When aiming to isolate tokens from the application's execution
context, the Service Worker MUST NOT store tokens in any persistent
storage API that is shared with the main window. For example,
currently, the IndexedDB storage is shared between the browsing
context and Service Worker, so is not a suitable place for the
Service Worker to persist data that should remain inaccessible to the
main window. Consequentially, the Service Worker currently does not
have access to an isolated persistent storage area.
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As discussed before, the use of a Service Worker does not prevent an
attacker from obtaining a new set of tokens. Similarly, if the
application is responsible for obtaining tokens from the
authorization server and passing them to a Service Worker for further
management, the attacker can perform the same operation as the
legitimate application to obtain these tokens.
8.3. Token Storage in a Web Worker
The application can use a Web Worker [WebWorker], which results in an
almost identical scenario as the previous one that relies on a
Service Worker. The difference between a Service Worker and a Web
Worker is the level of access and its runtime properties. Service
Workers can intercept and modify outgoing requests, while Web Workers
are just a way to run background tasks. Web Workers are ephemeral
and disappear when the browsing context is closed, while Service
Workers are persistent services registered in the browser.
The security properties of using a Web Worker are identical to using
Service Workers. When tokens are exposed to the application, they
become vulnerable. When tokens need to be used, the operation that
relies on them has to be carried out by the Web Worker.
One common method to isolate the refresh token is to use Web Workers.
In such a scenario, the application starts an Authorization Code flow
from a Web Worker. The authorization code from the redirect is
forwarded to the Web Worker, which then exchanges it for tokens. The
Web Worker keeps the refresh token in memory and sends the access
token to the main application. The main application uses the access
token as desired. When the application needs to run a refresh token
flow, it asks the Web Worker to do so, after which the application
obtains a fresh access token.
In this scenario, the application's own refresh token is effectively
protected against exfiltration, but the access token is not.
Additionally, nothing would prevent an attacker from obtaining their
own tokens by running a new Authorization Code flow Section 5.1.3.
8.4. In-Memory Token Storage
Another option is keeping tokens in memory, without using any
persistent storage. Doing so limits the exposure of the tokens to
the current execution context only, but has the downside of not being
able to persist tokens between page loads.
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In a JavaScript execution environment, the security of in-memory
token storage can be further enhanced by using a closure variable to
effectively shield the token from direct access. By using closures,
the token is only accessible to the pre-defined functions inside the
closure, such as a function to make a request to the resource server.
While closures work well in simple, isolated environments, they are
tricky to secure in a complex environment like the browser's
execution environment. For example, a closure relies on a variety of
outside functions to execute its operations, such as _toString_
functions or networking APIs. Using prototype poisoning, an attacker
can substitute these functions with malicious versions, causing the
closure's future operations to use these malicious versions. Inside
the malicious function, the attacker can gain access to the function
arguments, which may expose the tokens from within the closure to the
attacker.
8.5. Persistent Token Storage
The persistent storage APIs currently available in browsers as of
this writing are localStorage ([WebStorage]), sessionStorage
([WebStorage]), and [W3C.IndexedDB].
localStorage persists between page reloads as well as is shared
across all tabs. This storage is accessible to the entire origin,
and persists longer term. localStorage does not protect against
unauthorized access from malicious JavaScript, as the attacker would
be running code within the same origin, and as such, would be able to
read the contents of the localStorage. Additionally, localStorage is
a synchronous API, blocking other JavaScript until the operation
completes.
sessionStorage is similar to localStorage, except that the lifetime
of sessionStorage is linked to the lifetime of a browser tab.
Additionally, sessionStorage is not shared between multiple tabs open
to pages on the same origin, which slightly reduces the exposure of
the tokens in sessionStorage.
IndexedDB is a persistent storage mechanism like localStorage, but is
shared between multiple tabs as well as between the browsing context
and Service Workers. Additionally, IndexedDB is an asynchronous API,
which is preferred over the synchronous localStorage API.
Note that the main difference between these patterns is the exposure
of the data, but that none of these options can fully mitigate token
exfiltration when the attacker can execute malicious code in the
application's execution environment.
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8.6. Filesystem Considerations for Browser Storage APIs
In all cases, as of this writing, there is no guarantee that browser
storage is encrypted at rest. This behavior potentially exposes
tokens to attackers that have the ability to read files on disk.
While such attacks rely on capabilities that are well beyond the
scope of browser-based applications, this topic highlights an
important attack vector against modern applications. More and more
malware is specifically created to crawl user's machines looking for
browser profiles to obtain high-value tokens and session cookies,
resulting in account takeover attacks.
While the browser-based application is incapable of mitigating such
attacks, the application can mitigate the consequences of such an
attack by ensuring data confidentiality using encryption. The
[W3C.WebCryptoAPI] provides a mechanism for JavaScript code to
generate a secret key, as well as an option for that key to be non-
exportable. A JavaScript application could then use this API to
encrypt and decrypt tokens before storing them. However, the
[W3C.WebCryptoAPI] specification only ensures that the key is not
exportable to the browser code, but does not place any requirements
on the underlying storage of the key itself with the operating
system. As such, a non-exportable key cannot be relied on as a way
to protect against exfiltration from the underlying filesystem.
In order to protect against token exfiltration from the filesystem,
the encryption keys would need to be stored somewhere other than the
filesystem, such as on a remote server. This introduces new
complexity for a purely browser-based app, and is out of scope of
this document.
9. Security Considerations
9.1. Reducing the Authority of Tokens
A general security best practice in the OAuth world is to minimize
the authority associated with access tokens. This best practice is
applicable to all the architectures discussed in this specification.
Concretely, the following considerations can help reducing the
authority of access tokens:
* Reduce the lifetime of access tokens and rely on refresh tokens
for access token renewal
* Reduce the scopes or permissions associated with the access token
* Use [RFC8707] to restrict access tokens to a single resource
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When OpenID Connect is used, it is important to avoid sensitive
information disclosure through the claims in the ID Token. The
authorization server SHOULD NOT include any ID token claims that
aren't used by the client.
9.2. Sender-Constrained Tokens
As discussed throughout this document, the use of sender-constrained
tokens does not solve the security limitations of browser-only OAuth
clients. However, when the level of security offered by a token-
mediating backend (Section 6.2) or a browser-only OAuth client
(Section 6.3) suffices for the use case at hand, sender-constrained
tokens can be used to enhance the security of both access tokens and
refresh tokens. One method of implementing sender-constrained tokens
in a way that is usable from browser-based applications is DPoP
[RFC9449].
When using sender-constrained tokens, the OAuth client has to prove
possession of a private key in order to use the token, such that the
token isn't usable by itself. If a sender-constrained token is
stolen, the attacker wouldn't be able to use the token directly, they
would need to also steal the private key. In essence, one could say
that using sender-constrained tokens shifts the challenge of securely
storing the token to securely storing the private key. Ideally, the
application should use a non-exportable private key, such as
generating one with the [W3C.WebCryptoAPI]. With an unencrypted
token in the browser storage protected by a non-exportable private
key, an XSS attack would not be able to extract the key, so the token
would not be usable by the attacker.
If the application is unable to use an API that generates a non-
exportable key, the application should take measures to isolate the
private key from its own execution context. The techniques for doing
so are similar to using a secure token storage mechanism, as
discussed in Section 8.
While a non-exportable key is protected from exfiltration from within
the JavaScript context, the exfiltration of the underlying private
key from the filesystem is still a potential attack vector. At the
time of writing, there is no guarantee made by the [W3C.WebCryptoAPI]
that a non-exportable key is actually protected by a Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) or stored in an encrypted form on disk. Exfiltration of
the non-exportable key from the underlying filesystem may still be
possible if the attacker can get access to the filesystem of the
user's machine, for example via malware. This effectively makes the
potential attack vector equivalent to a session hijacking attack.
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9.3. Authorization Server Mix-Up Mitigation
Authorization server mix-up attacks mark a severe threat to every
client that supports at least two authorization servers. Section 4.4
of [RFC9700] provides additional details about mix-up attacks and the
countermeasures mentioned above.
9.4. Isolating Applications using Origins
Many of the web's security mechanisms rely on origins, which are
defined as the triple <scheme, hostname, port>. For example,
browsers automatically isolate browsing contexts with different
origins, limit resources to certain origins, and apply CORS
restrictions to outgoing cross-origin requests.
Therefore, it is considered a best practice to avoid deploying more
than one application in a single origin. An architecture that only
deploys a single application in an origin can leverage these browser
restrictions to increase the security of the application.
Additionally, having a single origin per application makes it easier
to configure and deploy security measures such as CORS, CSP, etc.
10. IANA Considerations
This document does not require any IANA actions.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[Fetch] whatwg, "Fetch", December 2024,
<https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/>.
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis]
Bingler, S., West, M., and J. Wilander, "Cookies: HTTP
State Management Mechanism", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-20, 17 March 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-
rfc6265bis-20>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
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[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC7636] Sakimura, N., Ed., Bradley, J., and N. Agarwal, "Proof Key
for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients", RFC 7636,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7636, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7636>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8252] Denniss, W. and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps",
BCP 212, RFC 8252, DOI 10.17487/RFC8252, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8252>.
[RFC8707] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Resource
Indicators for OAuth 2.0", RFC 8707, DOI 10.17487/RFC8707,
February 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8707>.
[RFC9449] Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T.,
Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of
Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449,
September 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9449>.
[RFC9700] Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett,
"Best Current Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security", BCP 240,
RFC 9700, DOI 10.17487/RFC9700, January 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9700>.
[W3C.service-workers]
"Service Workers", W3C CR service-workers, W3C service-
workers, <https://www.w3.org/TR/service-workers/>.
[WebMessaging]
whatwg, "HTML - Cross-document messaging", January 2025,
<https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#web-messaging>.
11.2. Informative References
[CryptoKeyPair]
Contributors, M., "CryptoKeyPair", n.d.,
<https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/
CryptoKeyPair>.
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[HTML] whatwg, "HTML", January 2025,
<https://html.spec.whatwg.org/>.
[OpenID] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
errata set 2", December 2023, <https://openid.net/specs/
openid-connect-core-1_0-errata2.html>.
[OWASPCheatSheet]
"OWASP Cheat Sheet", n.d.,
<https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/>.
[RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>.
[SessionFixation]
"Session Fixation", n.d., <https://owasp.org/www-
community/attacks/Session_fixation>.
[Site] Contributors, M., "Site", n.d.,
<https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Glossary/Site>.
[W3C.CSP3] "Content Security Policy Level 3", W3C WD CSP3, W3C CSP3,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/>.
[W3C.IndexedDB]
"Indexed Database API", W3C REC IndexedDB, W3C IndexedDB,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/IndexedDB/>.
[W3C.SRI] "Subresource Integrity", W3C REC SRI, W3C SRI,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/SRI/>.
[W3C.wasm-core-2]
"WebAssembly Core Specification", W3C CR wasm-core-2, W3C
wasm-core-2, <https://www.w3.org/TR/wasm-core-2/>.
[W3C.WebCryptoAPI]
"Web Cryptography API", W3C REC WebCryptoAPI,
W3C WebCryptoAPI, <https://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/>.
[WebStorage]
whatwg, "HTML Living Standard - Web Storage", January
2025, <https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#webstorage>.
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[WebWorker]
whatwg, "HTML Living Standard - Web workers", January
2025, <https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#toc-workers>.
Appendix A. Document History
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]
-25
* Use consistent terminology for "browser-based application", and
use JavaScript only when explicitly needed
* Replaced "hard drive" with "local persistent storage"
* Added a note about operational considerations for the BFF pattern
* "Forwarding" instead of "Proxying" to avoid confusion with HTTP
proxies
* Minor editorial nits
* Added more references to terminology on first use
* Added a reference for Session Fixation
-24
* Updated terminology definitions
* Fixed typos
* Updated acknowledgements
-23
* Ensure acronyms and other specifications are defined and
referenced on first use, and added to terminology
* Clarified mailicious JavaScript is the basis of the threat
analysis earlier in the document
* Clarified why filesystem storage of private key is a concern
* Clarified JS runtimes in intro
* Addressed feedback from secdir review
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* Clarified that the specific attacks described are the relevant
ones for this document because they are OAuth-specific
* Described the relationship to session fixation attacks
* Clarified that section 8 is talking about OAuth tokens
specifically
* Mentioned that localStorage is synchronous
* Applied suggestions about scope of malicious JS code from Martin
Thompson's review
* Clarified "attacking the service worker" to be explicit that this
is about the authorization code flow
* Clarified the intent of storing the refresh token in a web worker
* Mention explicitly access token and refresh token instead of "set
of tokens" on first use per section
* Slightly rephrased Web Worker section to not sound like a
recommendation
* Editorial edits to remove the phrase "perfect storage mechanism"
* Fixed references
* Addressed all feedback from the genart, opsdir, artart, secdir,
and httpdir reviews
-22
* Addressed AD review
* Moved RFC6819 reference to informal
* Added missing references from prose
* Replaced references to living standards with references to
snapshots
-21
* Removed unused references
* Removed reference to TMI-BFF individual draft
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* Moved some references to the normative reference section
-20
* Handled review comments from Rifaat (email 2024-11-13)
-19
* Updated DPoP references to RFC9449
* Corrected spelling of Brian Campbell's name
-18
* Addressed last call comments from Justin Richer
* Updated description of the benfits of Token-Mediating Backend
pattern
* Added SVG diagrams in HTML version
* Added privacy considerations for BFF pattern
* Consistent use of "grant type", "grant" and "flow"
-17
* Added a section on anti-forgery/double-submit cookies as another
form of CSRF protection
* Updated CORS terminology
* Moved new section on in-browser flows as not applicable to BFF or
TM patterns
* Fixed usage of some browser technology terminology
* Editorial improvements
-16
* Applied editorial changes from Filip Skokan and Louis Jannett
* Clarified when cookie encryption applies
* Added a section with security considerations on the use of
postMessage
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-15
* Consolidated guidelines for public JS clients in a single section
* Added more focus on best practices at the start of the document
* Restructured document to have top-level recommended and
discouraged architecture patterns
* Added Philippe De Ryck as an author
-14
* Minor editorial fixes and clarifications
* Updated some references
* Added a paragraph noting the possible exfiltration of a non-
exportable key from the filesystem
-13
* Corrected some uses of "DOM"
* Consolidated CSRF recommendations into normative part of the
document
* Added links from the summary into the later sections
* Described limitations of Service Worker storage
* Minor editorial improvements
-12
* Revised overview and server support checklist to bring them up to
date with the rest of the draft
* Added a new section about options for storing tokens
* Added a section on sender-constrained tokens and a reference to
DPoP
* Rephrased the architecture patterns to focus on token acquisition
* Added a section discussing why not to use the Cookie API to store
tokens
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-11
* Added a new architecture pattern: Token-Mediating Backend
* Revised and added clarifications for the Service Worker pattern
* Editorial improvements in descriptions of the different
architectures
* Rephrased headers
-10
* Revised the names of the architectural patterns
* Added a new pattern using a service worker as the OAuth client to
manage tokens
* Added some considerations when storing tokens in Local or Session
Storage
-09
* Provide additional context for the same-domain architecture
pattern
* Added reference to draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis to clarify that
SameSite is not the only CSRF protection measure needed
* Editorial improvements
-08
* Added a note to use the "Secure" cookie attribute in addition to
SameSite etc
* Updates to bring this draft in sync with the latest Security BCP
* Updated text for mix-up countermeasures to reference the new "iss"
extension
* Changed "SHOULD" for refresh token rotation to MUST either use
rotation or sender-constraining to match the Security BCP
* Fixed references to other specs and extensions
* Editorial improvements in descriptions of the different
architectures
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-07
* Clarify PKCE requirements apply only to issuing access tokens
* Change "MUST" to "SHOULD" for refresh token rotation
* Editorial clarifications
-06
* Added refresh token requirements to AS summary
* Editorial clarifications
-05
* Incorporated editorial and substantive feedback from Mike Jones
* Added references to "nonce" as another way to prevent CSRF attacks
* Updated headers in the Implicit grant type section to better
represent the relationship between the paragraphs
-04
* Disallow the use of the Password Grant
* Add PKCE support to summary list for authorization server
requirements
* Rewrote refresh token section to allow refresh tokens if they are
time-limited, rotated on each use, and requiring that the rotated
refresh token lifetimes do not extend past the lifetime of the
initial refresh token, and to bring it in line with the Security
BCP
* Updated recommendations on using state to reflect the Security BCP
* Updated server support checklist to reflect latest changes
* Updated the same-domain JS architecture section to emphasize the
architecture rather than domain
* Editorial clarifications in the section that talks about OpenID
Connect ID tokens
-03
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* Updated the historic note about the fragment URL clarifying that
the Session History API means browsers can use the unmodified
Authorization Code grant type
* Rephrased "Authorization Code grant type" intro paragraph to
better lead into the next two sections
* Softened "is likely a better decision to avoid using OAuth
entirely" to "it may be..." for common-domain deployments
* Updated abstract to not be limited to public clients, since the
later sections talk about confidential clients
* Removed references to avoiding OpenID Connect for same-domain
architectures
* Updated headers to better describe architectures (Applications
Served from a Static Web Server -> JavaScript Applications without
a Backend)
* Expanded "same-domain architecture" section to better explain the
problems that OAuth has in this scenario
* Referenced Security BCP in Implicit grant type attacks where
possible
* Minor typo corrections
-02
* Rewrote overview section incorporating feedback from Leo Tohill
* Updated summary recommendation bullet points to split out
application and server requirements
* Removed the allowance on hostname-only redirect URI matching, now
requiring exact redirect URI matching
* Updated Section 6.2 to drop reference of SPA with a backend
component being a public client
* Expanded the architecture section to explicitly mention three
architectural patterns available to JS applications
-01
* Incorporated feedback from Torsten Lodderstedt
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* Updated abstract
* Clarified the definition of browser-based applications to not
exclude applications cached in the browser, e.g. via Service
Workers
* Clarified use of the state parameter for CSRF protection
* Added background information about the original reason the
Implicit grant type was created due to lack of CORS support
* Clarified the same-domain use case where the SPA and API share a
cookie domain
* Moved historic note about the fragment URL into the Overview
Appendix B. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the work of William Denniss and
John Bradley, whose recommendation for native applications informed
many of the best practices for browser-based applications. The
authors would also like to thank Hannes Tschofenig and Torsten
Lodderstedt, the attendees of the Internet Identity Workshop 27
session at which this BCP was originally proposed, and the following
individuals who contributed ideas, feedback, and wording that shaped
and formed the final specification:
Andy Barlow, Andy Newton, Annabelle Backman, Brian Campbell, Brock
Allen, Christian Mainka, Damien Bowden, Daniel Fett, Deb Cooley, Elar
Lang, Emmanuel Gautier, Eric Vyncke, Erik Kline, Eva Sarafianou,
Filip Skokan, George Fletcher, Hannes Tschofenig, Janak Amarasena,
John Bradley, Joseph Heenan, Justin Richer, Karl McGuinness, Karsten
Meyer zu Selhausen, Leo Tohill, Louis Jannett, Marc Blanchet, Martin
Thomson, Matthew Bocci, Mike Bishop, Mike Jones, Mohamed Boucadair,
Orie Steele, Qin Wu, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef, Roman Danyliw, Sean
Kelleher, Thomas Broyer, Thomas Fossati, Tomek Stojecki, Torsten
Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, Watson Ladd, William Duncan, and
Yannick Majoros.
Authors' Addresses
Aaron Parecki
Okta
Email: aaron@parecki.com
URI: https://aaronparecki.com
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Philippe De Ryck
Pragmatic Web Security
Email: philippe@pragmaticwebsecurity.com
David Waite
Ping Identity
Email: david@alkaline-solutions.com
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