Strong Assertions of IoT Network Access Requirements
draft-ietf-suit-mud-04
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Brendan Moran , Hannes Tschofenig | ||
| Last updated | 2023-09-09 (Latest revision 2023-07-04) | ||
| Replaces | draft-moran-suit-mud | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews |
IOTDIR Telechat review
(of
-07)
by Michael Richardson
Ready w/issues
OPSDIR IETF Last Call review
(of
-06)
by Sue
Has issues
|
||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Associated WG milestones |
|
||
| Document shepherd | Russ Housley | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2023-09-05 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | AD Evaluation::Revised I-D Needed | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Roman Danyliw | ||
| Send notices to | housley@vigilsec.com |
draft-ietf-suit-mud-04
SUIT B. Moran
Internet-Draft Arm Limited
Intended status: Standards Track H. Tschofenig
Expires: 5 January 2024 4 July 2023
Strong Assertions of IoT Network Access Requirements
draft-ietf-suit-mud-04
Abstract
The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) specification describes the
access and network functionality required for a device to properly
function. The MUD description has to reflect the software running on
the device and its configuration. Because of this, the most
appropriate entity for describing device network access requirements
is the same as the entity developing the software and its
configuration.
A network presented with a MUD file by a device allows detection of
misbehavior by the device software and configuration of access
control.
This document defines a way to link a SUIT manifest to a MUD file
offering a stronger binding between the two.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 January 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Advantages over previous MUD URL reporting mechanisms . . . . 4
5. Extensions to SUIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction
Under [RFC8520], devices report a URL to a MUD manager in the
network. RFC 8520 envisions different approaches for conveying the
information from the device to the network such as:
* DHCP,
* IEEE802.1AB Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP), and
* IEEE 802.1X whereby the URL to the MUD file would be contained in
the certificate used in an EAP method.
The MUD manager then uses the URL to fetch the MUD file, which
contains access and network functionality required for a device to
properly function.
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The MUD manager must trust the service from which the MUD file is
fetched to return an authentic copy of the MUD file. This concern
may be mitigated using the optional signature reference in the MUD
file. The MUD manager must also trust the device to report a correct
URL. In case of DHCP and LLDP the URL is unprotected. When the URL
to the MUD file is included in a certificate then it is authenticated
and integrity protected. A certificate created for use with network
access authentication is typically not signed by the entity that
wrote the software and configured the device, which leads to
conflation of local network access rights with rights to assert all
network access requirements.
There is a need to bind the entity that creates the software and
configuration to the MUD file because only that entity can attest the
network access requirements of the device. This specification
defines an extension to the Software Updates for Internet of Things
(SUIT) manifest format [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest] to include a MUD file
(by reference or by value). When combining a MUD file with a
manifest used for software/firmware updates (potentially augmented
with attestation) then a network operator can get more confidence in
the description of the access and network functionality required for
a device to properly function.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Workflow
The intended workflow is as follows:
* At the time of onboarding, devices report their manifest in use to
the MUD manager via attestation evidence.
* If the SUIT_MUD_container, see Section 5, has been severed, the
MUD manager can use the suit-reference-uri to retrieve the
complete SUIT manifest.
* The manifest authenticity is verified by the MUD manager, which
enforces that the MUD file presented is also authentic and as
intended by the device software vendor.
* Each time a device is updated, rebooted, or otherwise
substantially changed, it will execute an attestation.
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- Among other claims in the Entity Attestation Token (EAT)
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat], the device will report its software
digest(s), configuration digest(s), manifest URI, and manifest
digest to the MUD manager.
- The MUD manager can then validate these attestation reports in
order to check that the device is operating with the expected
version of software and configuration.
- Since the manifest digest is reported, the MUD manager can look
up the corresponding manifest.
* If the MUD manager does not already have a full copy of the
manifest, it can be acquired using the reference URI.
* Once a full copy of the manifest is provided, the MUD manager can
verify the device attestation report
* The MUD manager acquires the MUD file from the MUD URL.
* The MUD manager verifies the MUD file signature using the provided
Subject Key Identifier.
* Then, the MUD manager can apply any appropriate policy as
described by the MUD file.
4. Advantages over previous MUD URL reporting mechanisms
Binding within the manifest has several advantages over other MUD URL
reporting mechanisms:
* The MUD URL is tightly coupled to device software/firmware
version.
* The device does not report the URL, so the device cannot tamper
with the URL.
* The onus is placed on the software/firmware author to provide a
MUD file that describes the behavior of the software running on a
device.
* The author explicitly authorizes a key to sign MUD files,
providing a tight coupling between the party that knows device
behavior best (the author of the software/firmware) and the party
that declares device behavior (MUD file signer).
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* Network operators do not need to know, a priori, which MUD URL to
use for each device; this can be harvested from the device's
manifest and only replaced if necessary.
* A network operator can still replace a MUD URL:
- By providing a manifest that overrides the MUD URL.
- By replacing the MUD URL in their network infrastructure.
* Devices can be quarantined if they do not attest a known software/
firmware version.
* Devices cannot lie about which MUD URL to use.
5. Extensions to SUIT
To enable strong assertions about the network access requirements
that a device should have for a particular software/configuration
pair a MUD URL is added to the SUIT manifest along with a subject key
identifier (ski). The subject key identifier MUST be generated
according to the process defined in [I-D.isobe-cose-key-thumbprint].
The following CDDL describes the extension to the SUIT_Manifest
structure:
$$severable-manifest-members-choice-extensions //= (
suit-manifest-mud => SUIT_Digest / SUIT_MUD_container
)
The SUIT_Envelope is also amended:
$$SUIT_severable-members-extensions //= (
suit-manifest-mud => bstr .cbor SUIT_MUD_container
)
The SUIT_MUD_container structure is defined as follows:
SUIT_MUD_container = {
suit-mud-url => #6.32(tstr),
suit-mud-ski => SUIT_Digest,
}
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6. Security Considerations
This specification links MUD files to other IETF technologies,
particularly to SUIT manifests, for improving security protection and
ease of use. By including MUD files (by reference or by value) in
SUIT manifests an extra layer of protection has been created and
synchronization risks can be minimized. If the MUD file and the
software/firmware loaded onto the device gets out-of-sync a device
may be firewalled and, with firewalling by networks in place, the
device may stop functioning.
7. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to add a new value to the SUIT manifest elements
registry created with [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]:
* Label: TBD1 [[Value allocated from the standards action address
range]]
* Name: Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)
* Reference: [[TBD: This document]]
IANA is requested to add a new value to the SUIT envelope elements
registry created with [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]:
* Label: TBD2 [[Value allocated from the standards action address
range]]
* Name: Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)
* Reference: [[TBD: This document]]
8. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C.
Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-21, 30 June
2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
rats-eat-21>.
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[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]
Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., Zandberg, K., and
O. Rønningstad, "A Concise Binary Object Representation
(CBOR)-based Serialization Format for the Software Updates
for Internet of Things (SUIT) Manifest", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-manifest-22, 27 February
2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
suit-manifest-22>.
[I-D.isobe-cose-key-thumbprint]
Isobe, K. and H. Tschofenig, "COSE Key Thumbprint", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-isobe-cose-key-
thumbprint-02, 16 June 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-isobe-cose-
key-thumbprint-02>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC7093] Turner, S., Kent, S., and J. Manger, "Additional Methods
for Generating Key Identifiers Values", RFC 7093,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7093, December 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7093>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8520] Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
Description Specification", RFC 8520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8520, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8520>.
Authors' Addresses
Brendan Moran
Arm Limited
Email: brendan.moran.ietf@gmail.com
Hannes Tschofenig
Email: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
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