Strong Assertions of IoT Network Access Requirements
draft-ietf-suit-mud-06
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Brendan Moran , Hannes Tschofenig | ||
| Last updated | 2023-11-14 (Latest revision 2023-10-23) | ||
| Replaces | draft-moran-suit-mud | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews |
IOTDIR Telechat review
(of
-07)
by Michael Richardson
Ready w/issues
OPSDIR IETF Last Call review
by Sue
Has issues
|
||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Associated WG milestones |
|
||
| Document shepherd | Russ Housley | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2023-09-05 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Waiting for AD Go-Ahead::Revised I-D Needed | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Roman Danyliw | ||
| Send notices to | housley@vigilsec.com | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA - Not OK |
draft-ietf-suit-mud-06
SUIT B. Moran
Internet-Draft Arm Limited
Intended status: Standards Track H. Tschofenig
Expires: 25 April 2024 23 October 2023
Strong Assertions of IoT Network Access Requirements
draft-ietf-suit-mud-06
Abstract
The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) specification describes the
access and network functionality required for a device to properly
function. The MUD description has to reflect the software running on
the device and its configuration. Because of this, the most
appropriate entity for describing device network access requirements
is the same as the entity developing the software and its
configuration.
A network presented with a MUD file by a device allows detection of
misbehavior by the device software and configuration of access
control.
This document defines a way to link a SUIT manifest to a MUD file
offering a stronger binding between the two.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 April 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Pros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Cons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Extensions to SUIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
Under [RFC8520], devices report a MUD URL to a MUD Manager in the
network, which then interacts with a MUD File Server to ultimately
obtain the MUD file. The following figure shows the MUD
architecture.
.......................................
. ____________ . _____________
. | | . | |
. | MUD |-->get URL-->| MUD |
. | Manager | .(https) | File Server |
. End system network |____________|<-MUD file<-<|_____________|
. . .
. . .
. ________ _________ .
.| | | router | .
.| Device |--->MUD URL-->| or | .
.|________| | switch | .
. |_________| .
.......................................
RFC 8520 envisions different approaches for conveying the MUD URL
from the device to the network such as:
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* DHCP,
* IEEE802.1AB Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP), and
* IEEE 802.1X whereby the URL to the MUD file would be contained in
the certificate used in an EAP method.
The MUD Manager uses the MUD URL to fetch the MUD file, which
contains connectivity-related functionality required for a device to
properly function.
The MUD Manager must trust the MUD File Server from which the MUD
file is fetched to return an authentic copy of the MUD file. This
concern may be mitigated using the optional signature reference in
the MUD file. The MUD Manager must also trust the device to report a
correct MUD URL. In case of DHCP and LLDP the URL is likely
unprotected.
When the MUD URL is included in a certificate then it is
authenticated and integrity protected. A certificate created for use
with network access authentication is typically not signed by the
entity that wrote the software and configured the device, which leads
to a conflation of rights.
There is a need to bind the entity that creates the software/
configuration to the MUD file because only that entity can attest the
connectivity requirements of the device.
This specification defines an extension to the Software Updates for
Internet of Things (SUIT) manifest format [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest] to
include a MUD URL. When combining a MUD URL with a manifest used for
software/firmware updates then a network operator can get more
confidence in the description of the connectivity requirements for a
device to properly function.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Workflow
The intended workflow is as follows, and assumes an attestation
mechanism between the device and the MUD Manager:
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* At the time of onboarding, devices report their manifest in use to
the MUD Manager via some form of attestation evidence and a
conveyance protocol. The normative specification of these
mechanisms is out of scope for this document. .
- An example of an attestation evidence format is the Entity
Attestation Token (EAT) [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]. Among other
claims, the device could report its software digest(s), and the
manifest URI in the EAT "manifests" claim to the MUD Manager.
This approach assumes that attestation evidence includes a link
to the SUIT manifest via the "manifests" claim (see
Section 4.2.15 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]) and that this evidence
can be carried in either a network access authentication
protocol (for eample an EAP method) or some onboarding protocol
like FIDO Device Onboard (FDO).
- The MUD Manager can then (with the help of the Verifier)
validate the evidence in order to check that the device is
operating with the expected version of software and
configuration.
- Since a URL to the manifest is contained in the Evidence, the
MUD Manager can look up the corresponding manifest.
* If the SUIT_MUD_container, see Section 5, has been severed, the
MUD Manager can use the suit-reference-uri to retrieve the
complete SUIT manifest.
* The manifest authenticity is verified by the MUD Manager, which
enforces that the MUD file presented is also authentic and as
intended by the device software vendor.
* The MUD Manager acquires the MUD file from the MUD URL found in
the SUIT manifest.
* The MUD Manager verifies the MUD file signature using the Subject
Key Identifier (SKI) provided in the SUIT manifest.
* Then, the MUD Manager can apply any appropriate policy as
described by the MUD file.
Each time a device is updated, rebooted, or otherwise substantially
changed, it will execute the remote attestation procedures again.
4. Operational Considerations
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4.1. Pros
The approach described in this document has several advantages over
other MUD URL reporting mechanisms:
* The MUD URL is tightly coupled to device software/firmware
version.
* The device does not report the MUD URL, so the device cannot
tamper with the MUD URL.
* The onus is placed on the software/firmware author to provide a
MUD file that describes the behavior of the software running on a
device.
* The author explicitly authorizes a key to sign MUD files,
providing a tight coupling between the party that knows device
behavior best (the author of the software/firmware) and the party
that declares device behavior (MUD file signer).
* Network operators do not need to know, a priori, which MUD URL to
use for each device; this can be harvested from the device's
manifest and only replaced if necessary.
* A network operator can still replace a MUD URL in a SUIT manifest:
- By providing a SUIT manifest that overrides the MUD URL.
- By replacing the MUD URL in their network infrastructure.
* Devices can be quarantined if they do not attest a known software/
firmware version.
* Devices cannot lie about which MUD URL to use.
4.2. Cons
This mechanism relies on the use of SUIT manifests to encode the MUD
URL. Conceptually, the MUD file is similar to a Software Bill of
Material (SBOM) but focuses on the external visible communication
behavior, which is essential for network operators, rather than
describing the software libraries contained within the device itself.
The SUIT manifest must then be conveyed to the network during
onboarding or during the network access authentication step. To
accomplish the transport of the manifest attestation evidence is
used, which needs to be available at the protocol of choice.
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5. Extensions to SUIT
To enable strong assertions about the network access requirements
that a device should have for a particular software/configuration
pair a MUD URL is added to the SUIT manifest along with a subject key
identifier (ski). The subject key identifier MUST be generated
according to the process defined in [I-D.ietf-cose-key-thumbprint]
and the SUIT_Digest structure MUST be populated with the selected
hash algorithm and obtained fingerprint. The subject key identifier
corresponds to the key used in the MUD signature file described in
Section 13.2 of [RFC8520].
The following CDDL describes the extension to the SUIT_Manifest
structure:
$$severable-manifest-members-choice-extensions //= (
suit-manifest-mud => SUIT_Digest / SUIT_MUD_container
)
The SUIT_Envelope is also amended:
$$SUIT_severable-members-extensions //= (
suit-manifest-mud => bstr .cbor SUIT_MUD_container
)
The SUIT_MUD_container structure is defined as follows:
SUIT_MUD_container = {
suit-mud-url => #6.32(tstr),
suit-mud-ski => SUIT_Digest,
}
6. Security Considerations
This specification links MUD files to SUIT manifests for improving
security protection and ease of use. By including MUD URLs in SUIT
manifests an extra layer of protection has been created and
synchronization risks can be minimized. If the MUD file and the
software/firmware loaded onto the device gets out-of-sync a device
may be firewalled and, with firewalling by networks in place, the
device may stop functioning.
7. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to add a new value to the SUIT manifest elements
registry created with [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]:
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* Label: TBD1 [[Value allocated from the standards action address
range]]
* Name: Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)
* Reference: [[TBD: This document]]
IANA is requested to add a new value to the SUIT envelope elements
registry created with [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]:
* Label: TBD2 [[Value allocated from the standards action address
range]]
* Name: Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)
* Reference: [[TBD: This document]]
8. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-cose-key-thumbprint]
Isobe, K., Tschofenig, H., and O. Steele, "CBOR Object
Signing and Encryption (COSE) Key Thumbprint", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-cose-key-thumbprint-
04, 23 October 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-
key-thumbprint-04>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C.
Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-22, 14
October 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-rats-eat-22>.
[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]
Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., Zandberg, K., and
O. Rønningstad, "A Concise Binary Object Representation
(CBOR)-based Serialization Format for the Software Updates
for Internet of Things (SUIT) Manifest", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-manifest-24, 23 October
2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
suit-manifest-24>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8520] Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
Description Specification", RFC 8520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8520, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8520>.
Authors' Addresses
Brendan Moran
Arm Limited
Email: brendan.moran.ietf@gmail.com
Hannes Tschofenig
Email: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
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