In most places that write files to the object database (even packfiles via index-pack or fast-import), we use finalize_object_file(). This prefers link()/unlink() over rename(), because it means we will prefer data that is already in the repository to data that we are newly writing. We should do the same thing in pack-objects. Even though we don't think of it as accepting outside data (and thus not being susceptible to collision attacks), in theory a determined attacker could present just the right set of objects to cause an incremental repack to generate a pack with their desired hash. This has some test and real-world fallout, as seen in the adjustment to t5303 below. That test script assumes that we can "fix" corruption by repacking into a good state, including when the pack generated by that repack operation collides with a (corrupted) pack with the same hash. This violates our assumption from the previous adjustments to finalize_object_file() that if we're moving a new file over an existing one, that since their checksums match, so too must their contents. This makes "fixing" corruption like this a more explicit operation, since the test (and users, who may fix real-life corruption using a similar technique) must first move the broken contents out of the way. Note also that we now call adjust_shared_perm() twice. We already call adjust_shared_perm() in stage_tmp_packfiles(), and now call it again in finalize_object_file(). This is somewhat wasteful, but cleaning up the existing calls to adjust_shared_perm() is tricky (because sometimes we're writing to a tmpfile, and sometimes we're writing directly into the final destination), so let's tolerate some minor waste until we can more carefully clean up the now-redundant calls. Co-authored-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>